Four: Public Policy

Problems at NASA

In light of the tragic events Saturday*, Nicholas Carter’s piece on the 1986 Challenger disaster becomes even more thought provoking. It’s fascinating to read: NASA slowly transforms itself from a “safety first” agency that spares no expense to protect its astronauts, to a desperate bureaucracy willing to put sacrificial lambs on the altar of public opinion to secure one more year of funding from Congress (1997, pp.185-195). There can be no other justification for a “Teacher in Space” program: it was designed to generate a lot of publicity which would, supposedly, translate into favorable public opinion, which would in turn generate political support in Congress and enough funding to continue. The budget cuts inevitably resulted in compromised safety. NASA middle managers were under pressure to maintain a schedule and get the shuttle missions in the air; managers at Morton Thiokol pressured their engineers—who were deeply concerned about flaws in the O-ring designs—to “rethink” their recommendations not to launch in cold temperatures. Way down the list of priorities, apparently, was the safety of the seven astronauts. Were these space flights unmanned, then cost-effectiveness could easily be top priority. It’s only money. But placing things like budgets and politics and publicity ahead of human life is downright un-American.

Like many others, I’ve been glued to CNN and Fox News Channel since Saturday’s Columbia disaster, and I’m surprised by a lot of what I’m hearing. The cause of Columbia’s disintegration has not yet been determined, of course, but early speculation is focusing on damage to the insulating tiles on the left wing of the orbiter. If this was indeed the cause, then that space craft and its crew were doomed from the outset: an escape pod for the shuttle was never included (too expensive); there is no way to get another shuttle up there to extract the crew; there is no way to repair the damage once in space. In other words, if the shuttle is damaged to the extent that re-entry in the earth’s atmosphere is too dangerous, there is NO contingency plan for saving the crew. There never has been. That is incredible! According to the Washington Times, last August a retired NASA engineer, Don A. Nelson, wrote President Bush warning about “inadequate safety” of the shuttle
program, saying, “Your intervention is required to prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident…if this is ignored we can watch in horror and shame as the
astronauts face certain death" (qtd. in Yost). Nelson’s warning was rebuffed by White House advisors. But even Congress’s General Accounting Office sounded the alarm, finding in 2001 that “the shuttle work force had declined significantly to the point it reduced NASA's ability to safely support the program. Many key areas were not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers and the remaining work force showed signs of overwork and fatigue…When it visited the problem again, it reported last week that ‘staffing shortages in many key areas still remain a problem'" (ibid).

Being a Monday-morning quarterback is dismal science at best, and who knows if any of the above could have helped in any way. Just as the early days of aviation
were highly dangerous and many people died pioneering the technology, space exploration is bound to be even more risky. There will no doubt be more catastrophes in the future. But safety should never be compromised for any reason.

*This essay was written a few days after the Columbia disaster.


References

Carter, Nicholas. "The Space Shuttle Challenger." Rpt. in Ethics & Politics: Cases and Comments. eds. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1997. 185-195.

Yost, Pete. "Tight Budgets, Fewer Experts Haunt NASA." The Washington Times, February 3, 2003.



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Freedom of Speech

The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally placed First Amendment rights—freedom of speech in particular—on the highest tier of all legal principles. But it is vitally important to understand what free speech is and what it is not, and why such a right was put into the Constitution. When asked about this, the average person may respond, “Free speech means I can say whatever I please, anytime… anywhere, because I want to say it.” But that’s not strictly true. There are in fact many limitations on speech. Slander is not protected speech; neither is obscenity. And according to Wilson, “you cannot freely use words that incite others to commit illegal acts or that directly and immediately provoke another person to violent behavior” (2000, p.319). Furthermore, threatening another person with bodily harm can get you charged with assault. I remember some years ago there was a guy in a local bar making death threats against then President Clinton. Next thing you know he was taken into custody by U.S. secret service. The purpose of free speech is for the health of the republic, as Justice Brennan wrote in New York Times v. Sullivan, “[it] was fashioned to insure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people…” and that “[it] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” Historically, of course, this kind of liberty was tightly suppressed. No matter who the tyrant was—Spartan oligarchy, Caesar, Roman Catholic Church, King George III, National Socialists, Communist Party, Taliban—putting down dissent was always a prime concern. Free speech could not be tolerated under those regimes. Surprisingly, we are still having the same debate today. Last year, for example, as the Bush Administration prepared for war in Iraq, those who opposed the president’s war policies often had their patriotism or loyalty called into question. But the health of the republic depends on a delicate balance between “loyalty”—i.e. agreement with the government’s actions—and dissent. The First Amendment is designed to safeguard that.

Federal or state employees, needless to say, do not give up their constitutional rights in exchange for the job. In Connick v. Myers (1983) the Court “tempered its decision on whether Ms. Myers was speaking out on a matter of public concern by noting that she was a disgruntled employee. In other words, her aims and motives were considered…” What we call “whistle-blowing” is indeed protected speech inasmuch as it is a “matter of public concern.” Many of our most important public policy changes have come as a result of brave individuals who risk their careers to publicize wrongdoing in their organizations. Scandals at NASA, Defense Department, FBI, CIA, National Security Council—the list goes on and on. Apparently, it is up to the courts to decide what constitutes protected speech in that context and what does not. If Ms. Myers publicized personal information about her superiors for no other reason than to embarrass them or to “get even,” she should suffer the consequences of her actions. If I did that where I work, I’d most likely be out of a job too. All organizations have a right (yes, organizations have rights too) to require a certain decorum in their public areas. No constitution gives someone the right to be a lout, a troublemaker, a threat or danger to others. Sexual harassment falls under this category too. It’s really a shame that full-grown adults fail to conduct themselves like decent human beings in the workplace—you’d think this sort of thing would be learned in the home. But that cannot be protected speech either. The whole issue is a question of balance between individual rights (for employees) and organizational efficiency. Too much emphasis on the latter could result in abuse. My favorite example is the IRS imposing collection quotas on its agents (with the threat of sanction if they didn’t meet them), which led to some nightmarish cases of government harassment. Most people will do whatever it takes to keep their jobs. Bottom line is public (and private) organizations are run by human beings with human failings, not by constitutions and political ideals. The ideal may be the thing we strive for, but in the everyday nuts-and-bolts world of work, these things have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.



References

Klingner, Donald E. and John Nalbandian. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Wilson, James Q. American Government 5th ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.


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Comparable Worth


A friend of mine, Mike, was telling me recently about how his wife had submitted fifteen or so job applications to various companies and had received ten calls in one day. In contrast, he would submit dozens of applications and get NO calls. “Why do you think that is, Mike?” I asked him. “Well,” he said, “employers believe that men are trying to support their families and will demand higher wages. Women are willing to work for less.” Sidestepping all issues of fairness or political correctness here, I think Mike’s observations shed some light on the psychology behind sex-based wage disparity. Men have traditionally been regarded as “bread-winners” while women only occasionally worked outside the home. If women did work, it was to supplement their husband’s income. Of course, this ethos belongs to an antediluvian era and has little to do with the modern world, but it continues to haunt public and private sector thinking as regards pay and benefits.

According to Gluckman, “Comparable worth proposals first appeared in the 1970s, when women's rights campaigners began to recognize that much of the pay gap between men and women occurred not because women were paid less for doing the exact same work, but because women workers were concentrated in occupations that paid less than male-dominated occupations” (2002, p.42). This happens to be part of the justification cited by CW opponents: “Women have lower seniority than men because they leave the labor market to have children or move from one job to another to accompany their husbands…” (Klingner & Nalbandian, 2003, p.144). We might refer to this as the Appendage Theory—that is, women are regarded as appendages to men, not as autonomous human beings in their own right. Again, “[c]omparable worth advocates… claim employers set wages in various occupations based on mistaken stereotypes about women—that women had little to contribute, that they were just working for ‘pin money.’ These wage differences have stuck over time, leaving the 60% of women who work in female-dominated occupations (as well as the small number of men who do) at a disadvantage” (Gluckman).

Nevertheless, wage disparity based on sex is illegal. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned all discrimination, and Title VII “specifically forbade discrimination in employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (Gibelman, 2003, p.22). More protection was added in 1991. The Equal Pay Act—Title VI—prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin in any program receiving federal financial assistance, including “programs that receive loans, tax breaks, or grants and contracts from the government” (ibid). There are also Constitutional issues involved, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, which affords equal protection to all citizens, under the law. Employment in civil service systems affords a somewhat higher level of equity and protection from discrimination due to obligatory compliance with all relevant federal and state statutes. Unions offer another level of protection. But in the private sector “employment at will” laws “limit the power of women and minorities to protest employment conditions…” (Klingner & Nalbandian). If a private sector organization receives federal funding, then a case of blatant discrimination may have a legal remedy under Title VI, but the best defense here is collective bargaining.

One well-known explanation for sex-based wage disparity involves a perversion of the classic “Law of Supply & Demand,” often cited by mainstream economists and opponents of comparable worth. According to this view, “Wages are not set by evaluating the requirements of each job… but rather by shifts in the supply of and demand for labor… Discrimination in hiring kept women out of many occupations, resulting in an oversupply of women entering the traditionally-female jobs such as nursing. This oversupply kept wages in those fields low” (Gluckman). But is this explanation valid? Does the law of supply and demand apply to the job market the same as it (supposedly) applies to the commodities market? In his 1981 book Overeducation in the U.S. Labor Market Russell Rumberger compared the years of schooling achieved by the U.S. working population to education levels required by the job market for the years 1960 and 1976. In every category of education (less than high school, high school, some college, college degree, advanced degree) there was a surplus of workers for the jobs available. For example, in 1976 45% of all jobs required no more than an Eighth Grade education, but only 23% of the workforce was at that level—meaning 22% of those jobs were filled by over-educated, and thus over-qualified, people. 20% of jobs required some college or a four-year degree, whereas 32% were at that level—a 12% surplus (1). According to supply & demand wages should be plummeting across the board—but not so. For “less educated” persons (without a college degree), real wage growth from 1973 to 2001 was essentially stagnant; for “more educated” persons, those with a four-year degree enjoyed modest wage growth while those with advanced degrees enjoyed significant growth (Mishel, et al, 2003, p.160). Therefore, the “Supply & Demand” explanation for sex-based wage disparity doesn’t hold water. All we’re left with is discrimination for whatever reason.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle faced by proponents of comparable worth is the creeping influence of market-based values in public administration. According to Klingner and Nalbandian, “For advocates of government efficiency, it simply makes no sense to pay women and minorities more than one would have to pay them under a market model…” Private organizations have gotten away with wage-discrimination for years because of reasons discussed above. But Koziara warns: “Private employers are not immune from changes in the political environment. Although pressure for comparable worth has focused on the public sector, many employers speculate about the possibility of legislation spreading from the public to the private sector. Thus, some employer organizations lobby actively to discourage comparable worth legislation in general” (1985, p.13). One must question how far market-based values should proceed onto the sacrosanct territory of public administration. For every advantage there’s a disadvantage; for every dollar saved there’s a social inequity. If public human resource management has a mission at all, it should be leading the way of true egalitarianism and social equity.

The issue of comparable worth is an issue of fairness. The controversies involve philosophical and moral concerns, such as: should women be treated as equals to men or are they some how “less” than men, and thus not deserving pay equity? Does the public sector have a greater obligation to provide social equity than the private sector? Are the traditional explanations offered by opponents of comparable worth legitimate, or simply excuses to maintain discriminatory practices? What is the efficacy of federal legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, if attempts to establish pay equity for women are on the retreat? I’ll not pretend to have the answers to any of these. But I do believe that every attempt should be made, especially in public administration, to create social equity in the work place. That’s because the legacy of America lies more in fairness and equality before the law than in efficiency and profitability.

References

(1) http://vesuvius.cnu.edu/SCRIPT/g383/scripts/serve_home

Gibelman, Margaret. “So how far have we come? pestilent and persistent gender gap in pay.” Social Work, Jan 2003 v48 i1 p22(11).

Gluckman, Amy. “Comparable worth” (Primer). Dollars & Sense, Sept-Oct 2002 p42(2).

Klingner, Donald E. and John Nalbandian. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Koziara, Karen Shallcross. “Comparable worth: organizational dilemmas.” Monthly Labor Review, Dec 1985 v108 n12 p13(4).

Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushley. The State of Working America: 2002/2003. Ithica, NY: IRL Press, 2003.


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Preferential Hiring and Promotion

“Affirmative Action,” rightly or wrongly, is associated with preferential hiring (and promotion) practices, in an effort to make better use of “under-utilized” groups—primarily women and minorities. Arguing against affirmative action tends to make one sound as if one is opposed to equal opportunity, but that’s not necessarily the case. Affirmative action need not be associated with such things as quotas and the perception of “reverse” discrimination, as I intend to show. First, a word or two about the law: According to Fullinwider, Executive Order 11246, issued by President Johnson in 1965, “required all federal contractors as a condition for
retaining or acquiring federal contracts to take ‘affirmative action’ to assure nondiscrimination in employment practices" (1997, p.286). Further, the Secretary of Labor was assigned the task of “designing and enforcing rules” to implement the Order, and this translated into goals and timetables for the hiring of said under-utilized groups. In practice, this means quotas. If ten jobs are available, five or six of them might require women or minorities to fill them—regardless of their qualifications. In other words, even if more highly qualified white men apply for the jobs, less qualified persons may be hired because they fit the racial or sexual profile required by affirmative action. No matter how you look at it, that is discrimination. It also violates Executive Order 11246, which mandates “nondiscrimination.” Thus, to be in compliance with 11246, no form of preferential hiring or promotion should be practiced.

One of the justifications for preferential hiring (let's drop the euphemism of “affirmative action”) is the idea that it is to rectify past instances of discrimination. Of course, this ignores the fact that, for the most part, neither those who were discriminated against nor those who discriminated against them (in the past) actually benefit from preferential hiring. The payment of back wages and the like are the only reasonable means to accomplish this—in AT&T’s case $45 million. Preferential hiring can work toward dismantling a present discriminatory system, however. The purpose of the quotas, apparently, is to make the organization’s work force reflect the “labor market” percentage-wise; and the labor market, I imagine, reflects the population. Thus, if your population is 50% women, 20% black, and 15% Hispanic, then your workforce should mirror that. It seems fair enough. However, it is based upon the false assumption that everyone in the labor market is more or less equally qualified. One will find, I believe, that the most highly qualified applicants tend to be disproportionately white and male. This reflects educational inequities. Educational institutions, of course, have to deal with this same problem, and they have done so through the very same methods—quotas, timetables, easing of standards, and so on. But these institutions—especially colleges and universities—are no better equipped to deal with what are, after all, cultural disparities, than corporations like AT&T. For example, if American high schools required that ALL graduates be fully literate, very few people would actually graduate. Colleges have to deal with incoming students whose English skills are, shall we say, substandard. I worked in the writing lab at TCC, and many of the students who came in for help were reading and writing at the 3rd grade level! (No, I’m not making this up). Point is, qualification levels do not match up to population percentages.

AT&T found itself indeed practicing “reverse discrimination” through the “affirmative action override”—that is, it “permitted (and required) [the] criteria—‘best qualifications’ and ‘longest service’—to be defeated whenever adhering to them did not allow the company to meet its goals (targets)" (ibid). This is the equivalent of graduating students from high school even though they read and write no better than 3rd graders. In my opinion, there is only one way to overcome the dastardly effects of preferential hiring and promotion—the scientific way. Here’s my proposal: if you have x number of job openings, gather your pool of qualified applicants (and here there is nothing wrong with making sure your pool reflects the labor market, percent-wise). Then randomly choose the persons to fill the jobs (using a truly scientific random selection process). Here there can be no charges of discrimination. And it complies with Executive Order 11246 beautifully.


References

Fullinwider, Robert K. "Affirmative Action at AT&T." Rpt. in Ethics & Politics: Cases and Comments. eds. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1997. 285-292.



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Substance Abuse on the Job

Probably the biggest dilemma facing employers, or anyone who wishes to grapple with the problem of substance abuse, is the fact that the most destructive and commonly abused drugs in the United States are LEGAL: tobacco and alcohol. The former is, by far, the most insidious, costly, and damaging to people of all ages. Yet all one has to do is visit a convenience store to purchase the nicotine delivery system. Nicotine addiction belongs in a category all its own, so let’s move on. Alcohol is also legal and can be purchased by anyone—of age or not (don’t know about you, but I did 98% of my life’s drinking while underage). My favorite quote: “Work is the curse of the drinking man.” But seriously, the legality and free availability of these drugs makes the self-righteous crusade against illegal drugs seem hypocritical. Eliminate the costs, both in healthcare and in lost productivity, attributed to these legal (and in some cases socially sanctioned) drugs, and all other substance abuse problems will suddenly be small and very manageable. The two main methods used by employers to combat this menace are a) pre-employment screening, and b) drug testing of employees. About the latter, such tests may be random or the result of “reasonable suspicion.” According to Klingner & Nalbandian, “The primary legal issue is whether personnel policies or practices should distinguish between legal drugs (alcohol and prescription drugs) and illegal ones” (2003, p.308). But from a pragmatic standpoint, it seems prudent to make no distinction between legal and illegal substances—the potentially harmful consequences are the same either way.

As far as the legality of drug testing is concerned, is there a difference between public and private employment? According to Bickford, the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA) affords a bit less privacy protection to public employees: “If the [employer] is not an ‘emanation of the state’, then the HRA cannot be used by the employee to pursue a claim… It is permissible for employers to interfere with an employee's right to private life in a democratic society to a degree necessary in the interests of, among other things, public safety. Where an employee has responsibility for public safety issues during their employment, the need for drugs testing, even on a random basis, could be argued to be proportionate” (2003, p.12). Nevertheless, drug testing can be required by private employers under certain conditions. For example, “Unless an employee voluntarily agrees to undertake a drugs test, [they] will need to have reserved a right to test for the presence of illegal drugs in either the contract or an appropriate policy. Even then, the extent to which [they] have the right for a random drug test is limited” (ibid). A friend of mine, a 20-year employee of Norshipco, told me on many occasions about the company’s policy of random drug testing (which included alcohol). Failing a drug test meant a mandatory drug treatment program, after which, of course, the random tests would come ever more frequently. A second failure could get you fired, no matter how long you’d been working there. Norshipco is a private employer, but there is a lot of federal money involved (most of their work is for the U.S. Navy). And when one considers the extremely hazardous nature of the work, one can understand the tough drug policy.

The reason why employers, especially those dealing with public safety, have drug policies in the first place is obvious: an individual’s right to privacy does not outweigh the public’s expectation of safety and security. But what is a fair policy? According to Ferraro and Judge, “[The] policy should clearly disclose the substances prohibited and what the testing will identify, under what circumstances testing will be used, who will be tested, who will collect the specimens, where and how specimens will be analyzed, and who will receive results. Many states regulate drug and alcohol testing, and organizations must be mindful of these differences as they establish their policies” (2003, p.94). Federal laws allow employers to test for alcohol and five controlled substances: marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, and POP (ibid). Another important consideration is when to require testing. Again, “These so-called test events include pre-employment, reasonable suspicion, post-accident or injury, random, return to duty following a violation, and a follow-up to treatment. Federal Highway Administration rules require that commercial truck drivers submit to a test under each of those circumstances” (ibid). The most important fairness issue, it seems to me, is that prospective or current employees have ample warning as to what the organization’s drug policy is—ahead of time. People should know very well what they’re getting into before they even apply for the job.

References

Bickford, David. “legal Q & A Drug testing at work.” Personnel Today, Sept 16, 2003 p12.

Ferraro, Eugene, and W.J. Judge. “Put your drug policy to the test.” (Legal Update) Security Management, May 2003 v47 i5 p94(6).

Klingner, Donald E. and John Nalbandian. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.



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Performance Appraisal Systems

Performance appraisals, based upon a system of periodic written evaluations, are considered advantageous or disadvantageous according to one’s point of view. From what I’ve read, HR managers and upper-level supervisors consider them useful, even indispensable. Employees and their immediate supervisors, on the other hand, tend to regard them as a nuisance or a waste of time. But they do provide some advantages. First, determining an employee’s pay status or qualifications for promotion can be based on an objective, quantifiable, job-related basis (as opposed to such things as patronage rewards, nepotism, good ole boy networks, or what have you). Second, an appraisal can be used as a method of measuring or documenting “productivity.” Third, they are a way of differentiating one employee from another—from the standpoint of those who are not in direct contact—and can provide HR managers with an indirect feel of who is working for the organization. Fourth, where disciplinary problems arise, performance appraisals can serve as a “paper-trail” documenting the sources of employer dissatisfaction. For example, two or three bad appraisals, followed by written warnings, followed by termination, would be much harder for a disgruntled employee to litigate than if there were no written records at all.
Primarily, performance appraisals are for the benefit of organizations rather than the individuals being appraised. According to Klingner and Nalbandian, “Performance appraisal is directed toward technical and management goals but rarely toward employee aspirations” (2003, p.262). As part of human fascination with science and technology, the temptation to apply those principles to the work place (traditionally a bastion of human relationships) has proven irresistible. One objective was an attack on entrenched bureaucracy. Consider the case of Jack Welch, who became CEO of General Electric in 1981: “Welch was intent on breaking up GE's legendary bureaucracy. His idea: Instead of following a traditional system, in which bosses could--and often did--rate all their employees as ‘above average,’ Welch had executives identify the top 20 percent of managers and mark them for advancement. They also had to identify the bottom 10 percent, who would then either have to improve or leave” (Clark, 2003, p.31-32). When Welch’s reforms resulted in soaring profits, executives across the country copied his “forced ranking” system (ibid). It may have been good for the top 20 percent and okay for the middle 70 percent, but it was bad news for the bottom 10. The real beneficiary, however, was GE.
In the unending quest for lower costs and higher profits, corporations now stress employee “productivity” as the answer, but in public organizations (almost all of which are not-for-profit) certain quandaries arise. If the organization provides “services,” how does one measure organizational productivity? Take for example, the fire department. Do we really want more “productive” firefighters by giving them more fires to fight? Of course not. According to Simmons, “The core assumption of most performance reviews is that if you clarify the gap between current performance and desired performance, that will drive improved performance. However, that's not the case. Instead, reviews tend to amplify the quality of the personal relationship between boss and employee” (2003, p.47). Indeed, of far more importance to the appraisal process is who does the appraising. According to Clark, “modern-day research confirms what every employee knows: A boss who happens to be in a bad mood gives employees harsher ratings. Studies also show that managers' subconscious stereotypes about race, age, physical attractiveness, and other characteristics affect their ratings” (ibid). Such practices tend to undermine the entire appraisal process.

Another serious problem concerns the validity of the appraisal instrument itself. We’re told that, “Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act requires employers to validate any personnel technique that affects an employee’s chances for promotion” (Klingner & Nalbandian). This recognizes the dangers of built-in bias, which happens to be one of the chief criticisms of forced ranking. Simmons points out, “Forced ranking is one example of a perfectly logical approach to performance management that turns into disaster for relationship management. No one disagrees with the fact we can't all be above average. The disagreement comes when we decide how often we choose to remind someone he or she is average” (ibid). It is indeed unrealistic to adopt a one-size-fits-all, cookie cutter approach to personnel management. Individuals have various strengths and weaknesses and it is nearly impossible to rank them all on a scale from one to ten, and score everyone on the same scale. Again, “Forced ranking creates ‘losers,’ and erodes cooperation and collaboration. Forced ranking forces a scarcity world view into a company's culture. Competitive types may be inspired to try harder, but less competitive employees won't. Note that quality often comes from the diligence of noncompetitive employees who display such noncompetitive behaviors as sharing resources and credit, as well as working even when no one's looking” (ibid). Thus, it’s entirely possible that employees scoring lowest on (invalid) appraisals may actually be of the greatest worth to an organization.

If used properly, however, performance appraisals can contribute to training and development of the work force. Communicating organizational goals and standards, if done properly, can have positive results. The key is a good management-employee relationship. Having worked in several situations where that relationship was adversarial, I have to say that it’s difficult to see how employee animosity, born of distrust, can benefit anyone. According to Axline, “When a performance review helps the individual recognize that his or her objectives are closely aligned with the organization's, the individual is more likely to perform at a higher level and the organization is less likely to lose a valuable employee. The objective of the performance review is to develop the person, not to threaten self-esteem. Treatment of people is the most fundamental ethical issue. Performance review is a matter of ethics” (1996, p.44). Almost all public organizations have strategic plans in place, and addressing the concerns of internal stakeholders is of paramount importance. Where mission statements speak of ethics and fairness, these things need to be put into practice, first by CEOs, and then by upper-level management.
It wouldn’t be fair merely to criticize the shortcomings of appraisal systems without recognizing their merits. Controversies that surround them usually result from a disconnect between organizational goals and objectives on the one hand, and the nuts-and-bolts realities faced by managers and workers on the other. The best solution would seem to be getting input from those workers whom the appraisals are applied to. And this should be a genuine, good faith attempt to develop a system that is accurate, equitable, and (above all) valid.


References

Axline, Larry L. “The ethics of performance appraisal.” SAM Advanced Management Journal, Winter 1996 v61 n1 p44(2).

Clark, Kim. “Judgment Day.” (effects and controversies surrounding performance reviews) U.S. News & World Report, Jan 13, 2003 p31-32.


Klingner, Donald E. and John Nalbandian. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Simmons, Annette. “When performance reviews fail: performance management often conflicts with relationship management. Negative feedback doesn't motivate; ignoring the subjective element in reviews undermines employee attitudes. Here's a proposal for an alternative review system that takes into account the important emotional aspects.” T&D, Sept 2003 v57 i9 p47(6)


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Collective Bargaining—Public & Private

Although collective bargaining in the public sector is unbelievably complicated compared to that in the private sector, it represents, nonetheless, a kind of oasis for the public employee. For the private sector world is best described as a jungle—a world full of predators and prey, unpredictable environmental conditions, dangerous parasites, and so on. That wonderful imagery comes from my 30 years of experience in the local job market. Such was the impetus for the formation of labor unions in the first place. There are many benign private companies, I’m sure, and working for them must be a pleasure. But there are also companies—Fortune 500 types—who indulge in practices on a daily basis that could only be capital crimes if committed by individuals. Can you picture Microsoft being put behind bars for 25 years? Or what about Wal-Mart sitting on death row? That company is like a serial killer—putting small retailers out of business in virtually every town they go to. Many foreign countries have banned Wal-Mart from their shores. Historically, it was worse… much worse. Thus, labor unions were formed. Before passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, there was, typically, all out war between unions and employers. Unions would stage violent strikes, attack “replacement” workers hired to take their jobs, strong-arm non-union employees into joining, and so on. Employers would attempt to break the unions with replacement workers, or by hiring gangs of thugs to attack striking employees. Point is, in that laissez-faire paradise that Republican politicians sing the praises of, where the only thing that matters is corporate profits, collective bargaining is simple. Without an agreement, workers go on strike and the business has to shut down (most of the time). Literally anything can be on the bargaining table—wage increases, working conditions, promotion policies, benefits packages, you name it. One body of federal law applies (Wagner Act—1935, Taft-Hartley Act—1947) and one regulatory agency rules (National Labor Relations Board). But within the boundaries of law, anything goes. The union could conceivably drive the company into bankruptcy (that’s one way of getting out of a contract!). Or if the union is found to be bargaining in “bad faith”—i.e. demanding things it knows full well management cannot agree to—it can be decertified as a bargaining unit. Either way, it’s a bloody fight.

Collective bargaining in the public sector is a bit more complicated. That’s because public organizations are a different kind of animal, existing not to generate corporate profits for shareholders, but to provide government services. Every once in a while a rogue organization gets loose (IRS, for example), but for the most part these are domesticated beasts, like so many dogs, cats, hamsters, and goldfish. They deliver our mail, collect taxes, regulate various industries, issue drivers licenses, educate the young, put out fires, take bad guys off the streets, and so on. Allowed to form collective bargaining units, these organizations function more like fraternities. Generally, strikes are out of the question. The main reason for that is one’s “employer” is not the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Division of Motor Vehicles, or Newport News Police Department—it is the public. Calling for a strike, therefore, is actually a strike against the innocent public, and this sort of thing is inimical to the idea of public employment. Instead of strikes, some sort of binding arbitration is the usual choice. Also, the items that may be negotiated on the bargaining table are subject to restriction. Wages, for example, may be set by the legislature and beyond management’s control. Benefits packages and promotion policies, the same thing. Working conditions might be a valid item, as well as conflict-resolution procedures. As for laws and agencies, Title VII of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act applies to federal employees; the Federal Labor Relations Authority is the agency. The various states, however, have their own laws and respective agencies. What public employees (and their unions) give up in terms of sheer power—that is, the power to cold-cock one’s employer and enjoy watching him bleed—they gain in terms of job security and individual rights: “Collective bargaining plays a unique role in the public sector because of its close and interactive relationship with the constitutional rights afforded public employees within civil service systems and because of the union’s role in protecting the individual rights of public employees as a dominant value” (Klingner & Nalbandian, 2003, p.353). Collective bargaining in the private sector is more like WWF Smackdown. Just out of curiosity, though, what would happen if a collective bargaining unit in the public sector did call for a (illegal) strike, and its members walked? The answer to that question is in "Air Traffic Controllers vs. Reagan: Lessons Learned from the Strike" (see below).



References

Klingner, Donald E. and John Nalbandian. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.



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Air Traffic Controllers vs. Reagan: Lessons Learned from the Strike


On August 5, 1981, 11,300 members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) found themselves, quite unexpectedly, fired from their jobs. As federal employees, they had been fired by President Ronald Reagan for illegally going on strike. Air traffic controllers belong to that class of “public safety” workers, such as police or firefighters, who, although allowed to organize through unions, may not strike against their employers. Yet PATCO had been threatening a strike for months—despite its illegality—to protest low pay, understaffing, poor working conditions, and the high-stress, high-pressure nature of their jobs. The confrontation between the union and the government—principally the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which regulates the airline industry—reached a much-publicized impasse during the summer of 1981, and came to a head August 3rd. PATCO called for a strike and the air traffic controllers walked. Two days later President Reagan, to virtually everyone’s amazement, fired the lot.


Work of the Air Traffic Controllers

The central hub of every airport in the world features a tower in which air traffic controllers work—guiding aircraft, large and small, during their takeoff and landing procedures. Communicating with pilots via radio, the controllers perform an extremely vital (and risk-laden) job; one mistake could result in catastrophe. Statistically, of course, air travel is known to be among the safest modes of travel. But when the rare accident does occur, the result is almost always horrible, with much loss of life. At any one time in the United States, there are as many as 10,000 aircraft in flight, and it is the air traffic controllers’ job to help the pilots get those planes safely on the ground. Coffey offers this description: “Some of these craft are ascending, others are descending, and still others are cruising at a fixed speed and altitude, heading north, south, east, and west” (1999, p.66). The glowing green radar terminals in the control tower, which track incoming and outgoing flights, are only a fraction of the whole national system. Again, “Each plane has been routed through an invisible architecture that, if visible, would look like a tower of boxes stacked ten miles high over the North American landmass” (ibid). In places where air traffic is especially heavy, “the larger boxes are divided into smaller boxes that are further diced into smaller cubes called sectors” (ibid). At a busy airport there might be one controller for each sector. Where there’s less traffic the sectors will be larger or more than one monitored by a single controller.

The complexity of the job can be overwhelming. There are roughly 15,000 airports in the United States and each flight must file a flight plan. It gets complicated because “aircraft are launching and landing every moment of the day and new plans are created almost constantly, and… some airplanes fly faster than others and cross each other's paths, and… all flights are affected by the weather and by the capacity of airports to receive and launch flights” (ibid). This requires three-dimensional human thinking augmented by computer power. Designing and controlling automobile traffic—itself a daunting task—requires two-dimensional thinking; but in air traffic there’s the extra dimension of altitude. Combined with the risk factor of even a small mistake, it is little wonder that controllers complain about stress. Then there are the effects of overwork. At the busiest airports “controllers often work grueling six-day weeks, eight hours a day, under the same kind of intense pressure experienced by ‘a doctor in an operating room’” (Chu, 1987, p.38). After the PATCO strike and mass firing, the system was so shorthanded that controllers averaged 800,000 to 900,000 overtime hours annually (ibid). Stress and overwork can lead to strained families, illness, and burnout. For these reasons, prospective air traffic controllers are cautiously selected.

Training is long and arduous—essentially a screening process to weed out “stress averse” individuals (Coffey). Hired by the FAA, many trainees are former military pilots or controllers. At training centers in Oklahoma City, Dallas-Fort Worth, and elsewhere, about half of all new-hires don’t make it through the initial three-month course. Three dimensional visualization and memory is the key; they must be able to instantly visualize the architecture of their assigned airspace the same way a homeowner knows the rooms and hallways of his house. Moreover, “Local [Twin Cities area, Minnesota] trainees learn… the geographical features of all nine states covered by Minneapolis Center, plus the particulars of all of the region's airports. They learn all 152 radio frequencies emitted by forty-seven remote communications sites scattered throughout the 350,000-square-mile area. Of course, they learn the difference between a Cessna and a Bonanza, and the individual capabilities of the BE1900, Airbus 320, and dozens of other aircraft they will separate” (ibid). After that come thousands of hours of practice.

But not even two-and-a-half years of practice and training are enough to certify a controller. They must have personal qualities to fit the job—they must be “assertive and convincing” (ibid). A controller has the authority to direct air traffic and pilots are trained to comply, but the pilot has the last word. The pilot can take whatever action he deems necessary to protect his aircraft. He may have to face a formal inquiry later—with his pilot’s license hanging in the balance—but he must be able to say “Unable” when instructed to do something dangerous (or impossible), which the controller cannot see. Controllers must practice and refine their skills throughout their careers. They “take psychological tests and must pass annual medical exams and the usual battery of drug screenings. They make good money (beginning at about $45,000 as trainees), enjoy generous benefits—and are required to retire by the age of fifty-six” (ibid).


Issues that Brought On the Strike

The struggle between PATCO and the FAA, which resulted in the ill-fated strike, revolved around issues of stress-relief, higher salaries, and outdated equipment. According to Kaye, “The controllers knew they were breaking a law that prohibits federal workers from striking. But they accused the Federal Aviation Administration of failing to keep its promises to modernize the air-traffic system and provide a less-stressful workplace” (2001, p.7988). During the 1970s stress was only just beginning to be recognized for the killer it is. Before that time, such a non-specific and ill-defined concept was thought of as highly suspect. During the early 20th century physiologist Walter Cannon at Harvard Medical School identified the stress reaction as “fight-or-flight response”—a basic survival mechanism. Greenberg explains: “Your body prepares itself, when confronted by a threat, to either stand ground and fight or run away,” but “in today’s society the fight-or-flight response has become a threat itself—a threat to your health” (1999, p.4). Factors with the ability to cause stress are called “stressors,” and these have the ability to trigger the fight-or-flight response—also called “stress reactivity.” This reaction includes “increased muscle tension; increased heart rate, stroke volume and output; elevated blood pressure; increased neural excitability; less saliva in the mouth; increased sodium retention; increased perspiration; change in respiratory rate; increased serum glucose; increased release of hydrochloric acid in the stomach; changes in brain waves; and increased urination” (ibid). All this prepares the human body for fight-or-flight, but when we don’t use it—when we neither fight nor flee—the accumulation of stress chemicals affects our health. Furthermore, “the longer our physiology varies from its baseline measures (duration) and the greater the variance from that baseline (degree), the more likely we are to experience ill effects from this stress reactivity” (ibid).

One could argue, as air traffic controllers have, that eight to twelve-hour shifts of intense monitoring has damaging effects. According to Blum and Lobaco, “In 1973, the F.A.A. commissioned a Boston University research team led by psychiatrist Robert Rose to conduct a long-term physiological study of the causes and effects of stress on controllers. Rose's 800-page report, published in 1978, revealed much depression and alcohol abuse among controllers. The study found an unusually high incidence of hypertension among the work force. Blood and urine tests of 406 controllers showed that 39 percent of them had excessive levels of cortisol, a chemical byproduct of stress” (1985, p.668). What’s more, “[a] 1978 study had shown controllers were two to four times as likely to develop high blood pressure and twice as likely to drink after work as people in other professions” (Kaye).

Some have even resorted to dangerous and unlawful methods. According to Banks, some air traffic controllers in the mid-1970s “deliberately directed aircraft to fly illegally close together to further the controllers' claims to retire early with generous benefits” (1983, p.39). This outrage (considering the potential for disaster) came from amendments made in 1974 to the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), which “liberalized the rules covering government workers claiming to have been disabled on the job—especially when the disability was less than obvious, as in mental illness” (ibid). Thus, if a controller could persuade a doctor to testify that he was suffering from mental stress, he could retire at two-thirds to three quarters pay—tax free. All that was needed was to show the injury happened on the job. How could this be accomplished? “Put two aircraft closer together than the five miles horizontally or, above 29,000 feet, the 2,000 feet vertically allowed by aviation law (three miles and 1,000 feet around most airports), and so cause what is called a system error, which is recorded. Then claim that the worry of it all meant that they could not sleep nights” (ibid).

Outdated equipment was another issue. In the brave new world of high tech, controllers were using “antiquated equipment from grease pencils and vacuum tubes to computers with one-thirtieth of the memory of a typical office personal computer” (Jochum, 1997, p.1). Even President Reagan agreed that air traffic control was antiquated, and promised to back PATCO’s efforts to modernize (Kaye). But the FAA’s response was that fewer than five percent of all controller errors were equipment related—most of it was human error (Jochum). Nevertheless, after the strike and mass firings the FAA began revamping the entire network. Kaye explains: “The agency… embarked on a $13 billion modernization program to replace computer, radar display, weather and communications systems at airports and radar centers across the country. It hopes to complete the project by 2005 and sharply decrease radar outages and equipment breakdowns that have plagued the air-traffic network for decades.” FAA supporters say that the increased volume of air traffic nationwide in the years following the strike accounts for much of the outlay; critics say the controller’s grievances were vindicated, despite official denials.

The Aftermath

The PATCO strike, of course, was not just a labor dispute—it was a violation of federal law. Not all controllers walked off the job: “Of about 13,000 PATCO members, 85 percent voted to walk. On the first day of the strike, half the commercial flights had to be canceled. Passengers were enraged, and the airlines lost millions. The FAA put its supervisors to work and brought in military controllers. Reagan gave the strikers 48 hours to return to work. Only 10 percent did. The rest received dismissal letters, banning them from working as controllers again” (Kaye). Afterward, “President Reagan steadfastly refused to rehire the strikers and instructed the Federal Aviation Administration to begin rebuilding the federal air-control staff from a core of 5,000 nonstriking controllers…” (Chu). It took more than two years for most airlines to fully resume their “hub and spoke” operations—but with significant exceptions. According to Levere, four “heavily trafficked” cities with continued restrictions included New York, Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles (1983, p.1). Nevertheless, the air traffic control system itself did not regain its former strength. According to a 1987 article in Fortune, “After more than six years, the Federal Aviation Administration has still not adequately replaced the 11,300 controllers fired by President Reagan. Despite a 26% increase in traffic during the period, there are some 2,600 fewer controllers on the job. Only about 70% of today's controllers have been trained to so-called full-performance level, meaning that they can handle all the duties required, compared with a pre-strike figure of about 81%. Nor has the FAA responded to the challenge of replacing the system's antiquated technology” (Labich, 1987, p.54).

PATCO, the air traffic controller’s union, was decertified as a bargaining unit and disappeared from the scene. In 1987 a new union took its place—the National Air Traffic Controller’s Association (NATCA)—but one determined not to repeat the mistakes of its predecessor. According to Chu, “[NATCA] has… pledged never to strike or to engage in work slowdowns.” As for the fired controllers, some paid hefty fines, some even did jail time, but only a few found work as air traffic controllers. In 1993 President Bill Clinton lifted the 12-year ban on re-hiring air controllers, and slowly they began to trickle back into the system (Jochum). The FAA, apparently, had less sympathy for them than the president, because “[a]lthough about 5,000 PATCO controllers reapplied, the FAA… rehired only about 800. Another 500-700 fired controllers… found jobs outside the FAA, working at military airports and at smaller airports overseen by private companies” (Kaye). These paltry returns support the view that “[t]he lifting of the ban primarily is a symbolic gesture” (Commuter Regional, 1993, p.2).

In the post-PATCO era, not only has understaffing been a serious concern, but the volume of air traffic has increased significantly. According to Blum and Lobaco, “The reduced force of controllers must handle a volume of air traffic 8 to 10 percent higher than the pre-strike level, as a result of deregulation and the improved economy. In some areas, such as New York City, traffic is up nearly 20 percent.” The FAA solution to understaffing combined with increased workload, “has been enormous overtime…In the last three months of 1984, 300 controllers, supervisors and staff at the Chicago En Route Center logged more than 14,400 hours of overtime. Similar workloads have been reported in Los Angeles, Atlanta, New York, Boston and elsewhere” (ibid). In contrast, European controllers average thirty-two hour workweeks. American controllers have difficulties taking vacations or even obtaining sick leave (ibid). As far as air traffic control is concerned, therefore, the more things change the more they stay the same.

Possible Solutions

Before one can propose a solution, a clear diagnosis of the problem is needed. The possible culprits—deregulation, bureaucratic red tape, incompetent FAA administrators…there is no consensus. Controllers themselves blame deregulation—perhaps the ultimate legacy of Reaganism. As one controller said, “Our basic argument is when you put profitability ahead of safety, the system suffers” (qtd in McPherson, 2003, p.3238007). Some airline industry analysts blame the government: “Instead of accelerating controller hiring and training and the purchase of computer systems, [the government] imposed slot controls at busy airports and implemented flow control to protect new controllers” (Del Rossa, 1997, p.16). What this amounts to is a band-aid approach. The money needed to fix the system has long been available, as Labich explains, “Various pieces of legislation now being considered would force the FAA to start tapping the Aviation Trust Fund, a $5.7-billion pool financed largely through an 8% tax on airline tickets and through fuel taxes. The fund is supposed to pay for modernizing both the air traffic control system and the nation's airports. To help keep the budget deficit down, the Reagan Administration has until now found it convenient not to allocate most of the trust fund.”

And there are advocates of deregulation, such as Steve Forbes, who believe privatization is the answer: “Don't blame the airline hassles today on deregulation. Where it has been applied, it has worked. The number of passengers since 1978 has gone from 275 million to over 425 million today and is expected to reach 600 million by the early 1990s. The number of airline employees, despite well-publicized contractions in certain carriers, has gone up, as has the average annual compensation per airline employee (up 50%)” (1987, p.29). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that a privatized air traffic control system would willingly make things easier by reducing work hours and adding more controllers. The FAA is the obvious player needed to step up to the plate. Public safety is the prime concern—indeed the only concern—and that is an item with no price tag attached.

The story of air traffic control in the United States is not very encouraging. The illegal 1981 strike traumatized the system, and reform should have followed. But FAA promises to upgrade equipment and refill the ranks of controllers were never completely realized. Probably the most damning fact I uncovered in all the readings was that European controllers work 32-hour weeks—a restriction designed to combat stress. There are some who downplay the role of stress altogether: “Like pilots,” Coffey writes, “controllers often describe their work—only half-jokingly—as hours and hours of tedium every once in a while interrupted by a few moments of terror…” One should reflect for a moment what that “terror” represents. With this in mind, all the talk of bureaucratic red tape, regulation vs. deregulation, privatization, etc., rings a little hollow. Public safety is the issue; therefore the documented complaints of air traffic controllers cannot be given such short shrift. The lethal nature of job-related stress has been well understood for many years now. Other public safety professionals, such as police officers, have similar problems. It is an essential HR function to manage these issues, and on that score the Federal Aviation Administration fairs badly. In the contest between President Reagan and PATCO, there was no actual winner but there was a loser: the flying public.


References

Banks, Howard. “A shocking charge.” (air traffic controllers and early retirement) Forbes, June 6, 1983 v131 p39(2).

Blum, Bill and Gina Lobaco. “The air-controller crunch: why the skies are unfriendlier.” The Nation, June 1, 1985 v240 p668(5).

Chu, Dan. “Six years after PATCO's crash, fired air controller John Thornton helps a new union get off the ground.” People Weekly, Sept 14, 1987 v28 p38(2).

Coffey, Richard A. “Mission: control.” (air traffic controllers) MPLS-St. Paul Magazine, Oct 1999 v27 i10 p66.

Del Rossa, Laura. “Analyst blames federal government for carriers' service woes; shrunken air traffic control system is one cause of delays, Pincavage says.” Travel Weekly, Nov 12, 1987 v46 n99 p16(1).

“FAA to permit rehiring of banned PATCO controllers.” Commuter Regional Airline News, August 16, 1993 v11 n32 p2(1).

Forbes, Steve. “The answer to intolerable congestion at America's airports.” Forbes, July 27, 1987 v140 p29(1).

Greenberg, Jerrold S. Comprehensive Stress Management 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999.

Jochum, Glenn. “Change comes slowly to air traffic control.” (Long Island air traffic control centers) Long Island Business News, July 1, 1996 n27 p1(2).

Kaye, Ken. “Former air traffic controllers meet to `vilify' Ronald Reagan.” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, July 31, 2001 pK7988.

Labich, Kenneth. “Why air traffic is a mess: more people are flying, but the system is short of controllers, new technology, airport capacity, and good management.” Fortune, August 17, 1987 v116 p54(4).


Levere, Jane. “Two years later, industry sees recovery from controllers strike.” Travel Weekly, August 29, 1983 v42 p1(2).

McPherson, David. “Air-Traffic Controllers Seek Ally against Bill to Expand Privatization.” Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News, August 26, 2003 pITEM03238007.