Ontology and PhysicsWhen Plato and Aristotle argued their views in the fourth century B.C. they were, I'm sure, quite aware that they were on the cutting edge of a new subdiscipline in philosophy--namely, science. It is science, more than anything else, which characterizes the world we know in the 20th century. Newtonian physics, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics have redefined many of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality.
The classic ontological debate between Plato and Aristotle may today seem quaint and frivolous--especially from the standpoint of Newtonian physics--but developments since the time of Newton have cast new light on the debate. Consider the human being, for example. Each person thinks of him or herself as a unique individual who was born on such and such a date, is x number of years old, has lived in this location or that, and so on. However, we know that our bodies are made of cells, which are composed of various molecules, which in turn are made of countless atoms. Where and when did these atoms originate? According to modern physics, all elements heavier than hydrogen and helium (atomic numbers 1 and 2, respectively) were forged by thermonuclear reactions within stars--events that occurred billions of years ago. This gives us but a tenuous claim to our own physical forms. It's as if we "borrow" the matter for a while, then return it to the earth after we die. In that case, who or what are we? Our bodies are simply reorganizations of matter/energy held together by our minds. So our true self has more to do with our nous (mind, soul, spirit) than our physical forms. This is strangely reminiscent of the Hindu belief that all material existence is maya, or illusion. Plato would be glad.
Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, while undermining Newton's physics, boggles our common sense understanding of time and space by proving they are really two aspects of the same thing; each can be defined in terms of the other. For example, how can time be defined spatially? Consider the Earth's orbit around the Sun. Not only does it set up the unit of time we call a year, the future can be defined as the orbital path to come, the past as the path already traversed, and the present as our current location. Can space be defined temporally? Back in the 1930s astronomers made a startling discovery: that the universe itself is expanding. It was this discovery that led to the "Big Bang" theory of the universe's origin. But it is important to understand that when we say the universe is expanding, that does not mean it is expanding through space. Rather, space itself is expanding, carrying the universe with it. The expansion of space is accompanied by the "forward" motion of time (as well as the unidirectional nature of entropy). What would happen if the universe should slow its expansion rate and then stop altogether? Gravity acts as a kind of cosmic brake and scientists have measured the rate of deceleration. What if the process should reverse itself--if the universe begins contracting and eventually falls in on itself in a "Big Crunch"? Would time's arrow also reverse itself and begin to flow backward? Such questions (at the moment unanswerable) demonstrate the spatial properties of time. The reason that relativity confounds us is that we habitually, even unconsciously, persist in thinking of time and space as two separate things. In this sense, time and space are like the yang and yin of Taoism--intertwined and interchangeable.
An even more radical departure from Newtonian physics (and good old English common sense) is quantum mechanics, a theory that bothered even Einstein, who resisted its implications to the end. Nevertheless, quantum theory is by far the most successful scientific theory ever formulated as it predicts the behavior of subatomic particles with a degree of accuracy that is unheard of in other branches of science. Quanta that appear as waves when one measures waves or as particles when one measures particles--but never both simultaneously--hint at a deep connection between mind and matter (or between observer and observed) that defies understanding. All this harkens back to the Buddhist belief in the "net of Indra" in which All is One and One is All; past, present, and future is really Now; and so on. Thus, separateness is really just an illusion of the senses.
In conclusion, it seems obvious that reality, as explained by modern science, reveals a universe that is more strange and mysterious than even Plato could have hoped for or Aristotle could have feared.
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Rationalism and EmpiricismRationalism and empiricism, the two main currents of modern philosophy, might be thought of as a continuation of the dichotomy established by Plato and Aristotle twenty-five hundred years ago in their deductive and inductive methods. More importantly, their emergence during the Renaissance heralded the revival of philosophy as an independent force--independent, that is, of religious dogma. Although both have their strengths in terms of ideology, both are also problematic if taken to an extreme. Is there some middle ground between them? Those are the issues I'd like to explore here.
Rene Descartes, the father of rationalism, sought to achieve some level of certainty with his systematic doubt and famous postulate "Cogito, ergo sum." Not trusting the senses (which can be misled), only his rational mind remained. He believed that all other truths could be deduced by reason in accordance with certain innate ideas. These ideas were inborn, and thus a priori. For example, when faced with apparent contradictions in validating the external world, he introduced the concept of a non-deceiving God as the ultimate source of certainty. Unfortunately, Descartes' logical breakdown in postulating God as a sort of bridge between knower and known raised the ire of his successors, such as Berkeley and Hume. Rationalism then degraded to solipsism--the complete denial of external reality--which is the ultimate position in Idealism.
It is incredible to my mind that any rational person would seriously believe the external world doesn't exist--that it is all some elaborate delusion. Yet, that was the logical result of Descartes' thinking. Did he really prove there is no reality "out there," that it is all in our heads? No, what he demonstrated was the limitations of logic. Logic is like a tool one uses in forming a worldview, as one employs a hammer or a power drill while building a house. Logic is a good servant but a poor master; would a carpenter allow his hammer or drill to take over direction of the construction site? Of course not. Logic must be sublimated--in some cases to intuition, in others to common sense.
Empiricism, on the other hand, was an alternative approach. Pioneered primarily in Britain by such figures as Francis Bacon and John Locke, Descartes' notion of innate ideas was rejected out of hand. Locke considered the human mind to be tabula rasa, or a blank slate upon which experience wrote its score. It was only by gathering evidence and conducting experiments that knowledge could be obtained. Here were the beginnings of modern scientific method.
While we cannot deny the effectiveness of scientific method, it does have a kind of built-in flaw. That is, it cannot account for consciousness, or mind, or anything immaterial. Empiricism thus confronts the same dilemma as rationalism: how to resolve the contradiction between idealism and realism--that is, the Platonic and Aristotelian divide. Descartes introduced God as a bridge spanning the gap, but no such bridge exists in empirical thought. Therefore, scientists tend to reduce everything to material processes. Thoughts, for example, are considered electrical impulses in the brain; love results from the genetic drive to reproduce; intuition comes from subtle hypersensory stimuli; and so on. Realism, taken to such an extreme, paves the way to materialism and atheism.
Immanuel Kant, aroused from his "dogmatic slumbers" by this debate, attempted to reconcile rationalism and empiricism in his landmark book, Critique of Pure Reason. Kant upheld the objectivity of the mind by pointing out that even though countless sense impressions flow into the mind at all times, it requires the subjective consciousness to sort through all the data and cognize only what is needed (or wanted). Much of this is done unconsciously; otherwise, one would be too distracted by minutiae to function at all. Thus, the mind cannot be solely tabula rasa, but the extent to which innate ideas are present is debatable.
Here we must make a distinction between consciousness itself (thinking) and thought (that which is thought about). The whole process is a reciprocal action between subject and object, and the source of our thought content is derived from the external world through our senses. All living organisms have sense organs, even plants. In animals, for instance, eyes have evolved from the insect level to our own; their purpose is to receive visual data. Are we to think that such useful, even necessary, organs have developed over the course of millions of years just so we human beings can fool ourselves into thinking there is an external world when there is not? If we seek absolute certainty in all things, how certain do we have to be? If we want to be sure that the Moon is "really there," does that mean we must each build a spaceship and go there? I'd say there is a general consensus about the reality of the external world that we can trust for the most part. What philosophers seem to be debating is not the existence or non-existence of the universe, but the meaning and significance of what they perceive.
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Political Theory: Argument for ModerationLiberalism and conservativism are, in political theory, the two poles about which our democratic society revolves, although the meanings associated with these terms have changed historically. For example, one does not normally think of liberalism as being concerned with individual liberties or limited government--two concepts that go hand in hand. Indeed, it could be argued that asking the federal government to safeguard civil liberties is a bit like asking the fox to guard the hen-house. But as American history has progressed, it appears that positions once considered liberal are now conservative, and vice-versa. Liberalism has come to be associated with progressive change, whereas conservatism advocates maintaining the status quo, or even returning to the mythical "good ole days"--i.e. to a time of greater morality, greater freedom, and greater clarity of purpose. The fact that, in my estimation, America never was such a place, seems not to matter a whit. But it occurs to me that neither position can be absolute in itself without doing tremendous harm.
At the time of the American Revolution the liberal position was that of the revolutionaries seeking to cast off the yoke of colonialism; the conservative position was that of the Tories--those loyal to the British Crown. Such loyalists were, by and large, the ones who had the most to lose. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, had something to gain by seeking independence. Laissez-faire economics, best expressed in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, must have seemed quite attractive to what was, at that time, an agrarian culture.
However, history has proved a fatal flaw in Smith's economic theory: it presupposes ethical behavior on the part of those who control the wealth. American business during the 19th century became ruthless and avaricious. Why do we now have federal antitrust laws? Why do we have labor unions? Such things belie the naiveté of traditional liberalism. That was mostly true in the industrial North, though. The South was still agrarian and built upon the foundation of slave labor.
Slavery, the most egregious error in the establishment of this nation, had its roots in Eurocentric racial attitudes, which regarded the white man as superior to all others. John Locke wrote of God-given "natural rights," including rights to life, liberty, and property. Thomas Jefferson incorporated these ideas into the Declaration of Independence. I don't mean to besmirch that great document, but we must realize that these "inalienable rights" applied only to white men. Women didn't have these rights, Native Americans didn't have them, and blacks certainly didn't have them. In fact, black slaves were "property" to which slave owners had the right to do as they pleased.
The struggle over slavery, then, caused liberalism and conservatism to switch poles. Liberals now advocated the abolition of slavery, and the Republican Party was created to further that aim. Conservatives opposed such a radical view and made the Democratic Party their bulwark, at least in the South. Interestingly, another great institution was used in justifying and maintaining the enslavement of blacks: Southern Christianity. This is perhaps the dirty secret that nobody these days wishes to acknowledge, but I will acknowledge it. Southern white Christians were adamant that blacks were racially inferior, and thus morally and mentally deficient. I myself spent several years in the Deep South locking horns with fundamentalist Christians, and know from personal experience how racist many of them are. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in his letter from the Birmingham Jail, expressed his dismay at the lack of support for the Civil Rights Movement from white churches, but that does not surprise me at all. As a southern black, he should have known better.
The Civil Rights Movement of the 50s and 60s, spearheaded by Dr. King, was really an attempt to make America live up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. In this instance, liberalism occupied the moral highground while conservatism was denounced as "reactionary." Unfortunately, liberalism began to lose ground when another issue came to the fore: the War in Vietnam. Without raising the legitimate question of whether the United States should have been involved in Vietnam in the first place, the anti-war demonstrators made the unconscionable mistake of mistreating American soldiers returning from the war--men who had risked their lives and suffered for their country. During the 1970s liberal attitudes became virulently anti-patriotic and anti-traditional. During those years, which peaked with the Carter Administration, expressions of patriotism were viewed with deep suspicion. Anyone waving a flag or singing "My Country 'tis of Thee" was ridiculed, labeled a fascist, or otherwise shouted down. In my view, any nation where patriotism cannot be expressed without hostile reactions is deeply troubled. Liberalism, it seemed, had failed.
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was, therefore, a major turning point for conservatism. Middle America was weary of all the "blame America" rhetoric emanating from the left and said so through the ballot-box. The most important thing Reagan did for America, I believe, was that he made it okay to be patriotic again. I find it noteworthy that Reagan was most popular among the young.
Since that time liberalism has revived somewhat, evidenced by the rejection of George Bush in favor of Bill Clinton. Liberals have seen the error of their ways, I think, and are once again seeking the moral edge they once enjoyed. Conservatives, on the other hand, are circling the wagons and seem obsessed with their vendetta against Clinton. Obviously, extreme positions--liberal or conservative--cannot solve the social ills of America. Consensus and cooperation for the common good will lead to the best result for all people. Political extremism, on the left or right, will not.
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Imposition of Islamic LawThis article by Michael A. Lev, “Malaysian state plans to install strict Islamic criminal law,” appeared October 30, 2003. The local government of Terrengganu—a state, or province of Malaysia—is planning to implement strict Islamic criminal law for Muslims, “including severe punishments for adultery, theft and blasphemy” (p.7350). Malaysia has a Muslim majority but a large non-Muslim population of ethnic Chinese and Indians. It is a secular society, where the Shari’a has never been attempted before. The central government holds that imposing Shari’a will violate the nation’s constitution. As in other parts of the world, Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise in Malaysia. It has long been opposed, however, by longtime Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir. The 77-year-old political leader is about to retire, and opposition parties, such as the Muslim PAS party, intend to take advantage (not unlike early American politicians vying for the presidency upon George Washington’s retirement). Terengganu is one of two states PAS controls, and is thus targeted for this dramatic alternative to secular rule. According to Tev, “Malaysia already recognizes a limited form of Islamic law for minor offenses, punishable by not more than a $1,300 fine or six strokes of the cane. Under the strict version endorsed by PAS, the penalty for theft can be the amputation of a hand, and a woman convicted of adultery can be stoned to death” (ibid). Other aspects of Muslim law/tradition include head-scarves for women, separate checkout lines at supermarkets, and sexually segregated swimming facilities. Officials say there will be some limited freedom to privately eschew religion, that there will not be religious police making sure people pray at home, but “all Muslims would be required to respect religious practice, such as fasting during Ramadan, or face penalties” (ibid).
I’ve been doing a lot of reading about Islamic law, and I have to say that strict application of the Shari’a flies in the face of a centuries-long tradition of liberal Islamic jurisprudence. Briefly, there is shari’a, the law based on holy texts, and fiqh, which interprets the law and includes the component of “ijtihad” or independent reasoning. Shari’a and fiqh are held to be interdependent. Since shari’a cannot possibly apply to every situation indiscriminately, Muslim judges were traditionally given wide latitude in deciding things case by case. Frequently, some of the harsher penalties imposed by shari’a could be avoided through creative legal doctrines. For example, Islamic courts developed the notion of the “sleeping fetus” to avoid executing women with illegitimate children. All in all, the liberal—that is, traditional—application of law in Muslim societies seems relatively reasonable. The fundamentalist agenda, however, is to eliminate fiqh and close the door on ijtihad altogether. The draconian force of Shari’a is all that’s desired, or acceptable. To compare this situation to our own culture, it would be like abandoning centuries of constitutional law and religious liberty to return to medieval Catholicism, with its heresy hunters, Grand Inquisitors, implements of torture, and public executions. To an American, of course, this sort of thing is a horror story, and it is not easy to be objective about it. I could almost (almost but not quite) accept certain criminal penalties. Perhaps thieves deserve having their hands amputated. But do “adulterous” women deserve being stoned to death? And why does the woman bear the full brunt of punishment in such cases? Tolson (2003, p.60) describes the situation in Nigeria, “…at the end of September, in one of a dozen Nigerian states that have adopted sharia (Islamic law), a religious appeals court overturned the death sentence of Amina Lawal, 32, a Muslim woman accused of adultery. Yet while Lawal was spared the gruesome fate of death by stoning, at least five other women in Nigeria still face the same sentence.” Why is it the women, and only the women, face capital punishment for this “crime”? Part of it has to do with patriarchal Arab customs. For example, “within the Arab honor code, individual rights are secondary to one's status within the family or tribe. Women are reduced to ‘communal or tribal property.’ In Pakistan or Nigeria…a man from one tribe or family may rape a woman from another as an act of communal retribution” (ibid).
But what troubles me most of all is the complete lack of religious freedom under Islamic law (at least for Muslims). According to the Lev article “blasphemy” is one of the crimes subject to punishment. Another is “apostasy,” which means, simply, abandoning the Islamic faith. It could also mean criticizing the faith. Either way, under Islamic Law, the punishment is death. According to Johansen (2003, p.687), “Apostasy trials against professors, intellectuals, artists, and writers were by no means rare in the Arab world of the 1980s and 1990s, and their number dramatically increased during these two decades…in 1985 the Muslim reformer Muhammad Mahmud Taha was executed in Sudan. In 1986, a Yemenite professor of sociology, Hamud al-'Awdi, was sentenced by a Yemeni court to a capital punishment that could only have been invalidated by the court if Professor al-'Awdi had revoked the statements that the court held to be irreconcilable with Islam. Professor al-'Awdi escaped execution by fleeing to Syria and other Arab states.” Academics like al’Awdi may not have been technically guilty of apostasy, but were held to have written things “incompatible” with the faith. In many cases, these men (women have little say in that part of the world) were reformers, attempting to bring Islam into the 21st century. Again, “…those condemned are born Muslims, declare themselves to be Muslim believers, and act for what they see as a better understanding of Islam. They are condemned for their writings and publications or for words spoken in public, either in political or educational contexts. Apostasy has increasingly been treated as a crime committed in books or speeches, independently of the religious self-perception of the author. The trial history of the intellectuals mentioned is well documented and shows how and for what purpose the mechanism of persecution is put into place” (ibid). Needless to say, all of the above reeks of the sort of religious paranoia the Western civilization abandoned long ago. That so many find fundamentalism, whatever its stripe, appealing in this day and age, casts a pall of foreboding over the immediate future.
References Johansen, Baber. “Apostasy as objective and depersonalized fact: two recent Egyptian court judgments.” Social Research, Fall 2003 v70 i3 p687(25).
Lev, Michael. “Malaysian state plans to install strict Islamic criminal law.” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Oct 30, 2003 pK7350.
Tolson, Jay. “Faith & Freedom.” (women's rights and Islamic law) U.S. News & World Report, Nov 10, 2003 v135 i16 p60.
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ApostasyFor much of the history of Christianity (from the time of Constantine to the late 18th century), your religious belief—or lack of it—could get you in serious trouble. For example, the early Church ruthlessly exterminated a rival Christian sect known as Gnostics—a group that taught, essentially, that Christ did not live in the flesh but only in spiritual form. These people were hunted down for their “heresy,” given a chance to convert to Catholicism, and if they refused, adjudicated as criminals. Many Gnostics were put to death. As the Roman Empire divided and then crumbled, the Church acted as a stabilizing force in Europe, but it also assumed many of the temporal powers nowadays reserved to the state. This marriage of judicial power, executive power (i.e. law enforcement), and ecclesiastical authority produced a system of abuse, well documented in history books. To medieval Europeans, though, the whole notion of “religious freedom” that we enjoy today would have seemed strange indeed. Islam, as we’ve studied, recognizes no distinction between religious matters and political matters, due to the all encompassing nature of the faith. An Iranian Muslim once told me that the main function of mosques in his country was “politics.” I find it fascinating, however, the way Muslim courts deal with the “crime” of apostasy. According to Johansen, “The classical Hanafi doctrine defined the punishment of apostasy as a punishment for warfare against the Muslim community, not as a punishment for unbelief. This approach, unique among the schools of fiqh, spells out the jurists' hesitation to directly interfere with questions of belief” (2003, p.687). Nevertheless, due to the upsurge of fundamentalism in Muslim countries, the idea of apostasy is being redefined: “The jurists' movement for the ‘codification of Islamic law’ gained in momentum during the 1980s when, in a number of states, it succeeded in assuring a place in the modern criminal codes for classical apostasy rules. In other states, such as Egypt, the highest courts opened the way for apostasy trials. The analysis of one apostasy judgment of the highest Egyptian court shows that the court understands belief and apostasy as objective facts that can be separated from the person who professes or denies them. The court effectively claims the role of the highest instance in questions of belief and unbelief. Apostasy thus becomes a depersonalized objective fact without any relation to the intentions of the individuals concerned” (ibid). In other words, “The court's definition of apostasy serves to control the ideas that can legitimately be discussed in the public sphere. It denies bold reinterpretations of Islam, but implicitly also a number of political persuasions and theories, the right of access to the public space and assigns them the private sphere as their legitimate abode” (ibid). This effectively eliminates any freedom of speech or the press, thus, “[the] courts, in their reasoning, use the terms ‘warfare’ and ‘aggression’ to define the character of public utterances on the interpretation of religion that do not meet with their approval. The courts thus pretend that they are not judging the individual's personal belief, but only his public acts. They try to draw a line of distinction between the private sphere of belief or unbelief and the public sphere in which the wrong opinion constitutes apostasy. The private sphere is left to the individual's internal forum; the public sphere is tightly controlled by the external forum of the courts. This means that the constitutional right of freedom of religion is restricted to the individual's internal forum and does not--not even for Muslims, let alone for non-Muslims--serve as the legal basis for a public debate between different interpretations of the relationship between religion, the state, society, and culture. The constitutional right to the freedom of cult and religion is banned from the public sphere and its content largely voided” (ibid). Freedom of religion, therefore, goes down the toilet also. This is one reason why I firmly believe mankind is now, more than ever, facing a choice between freedom and slavery. Once we feared communist domination, but that threat is nothing compared to the fate religious fundamentalism has in store for us (if it wins the upper hand).
ReferenceJohansen, Baber. “Apostasy as objective and depersonalized fact: two recent Egyptian court judgments.” Social Research, Fall 2003 v70 i3 p687(25).
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The Nature of GodThe French philosopher Voltaire once wrote: "In the opinion that there is a God, there are difficulties, but in the contrary opinion there are absurdities." Such absurdities arise when one tries to account for the existence of creation without a Creator, or the presence of life on earth--ourselves included--as the result of some blind, random process. Indeed, I find such scientific views to be just as preposterous as some religious ones. For myself, as with Voltaire, belief in God began as a simple premise in logic and continued to develop along those lines. In order for there to be a "first cause" as logic demands, the cause itself must be uncaused; therefore, God is an entity that has always existed and will continue to exist forever. In addition to being Eternal, God is also Absolute, Unchanging, and Unique. If we human beings are created in the image and likeness of God, then we must also be eternal, absolute, unchanging, and unique--at least potentially. The full development of our human potential is what the Creator strives for.
Nothing, however, creates more of a misconception about God than the notion of omnipotence. Taken to an extreme, many ascribe to God magical and supernatural powers, thinking that He can do literally anything because He is God. But this naive assumption raises a number of contradictions. Can God, for instance, make a triangle that does not have three sides and three angles? Clearly, there are some things even God cannot do. This is not to deny His omnipotence but rather to affirm the basic lawfulness of His nature. What then, are the limits of God's "omnipotence"?
First, God is bound by natural law. That means everything God does, without exception, is done within the confines of natural science, in accordance with the laws of physics, thermodynamics, mathematics, and so on. The miracles that are recorded in the Bible may be explained in any number of ways, but one thing is certain: God has never performed a magical or supernatural act. Second, there is a kind of self-imposed restraint God adheres to in His dealings with human beings. This is called the law of human responsibility, or God's law of non-interference in the affairs of men. An example of this law appears in the story of Adam and Eve, when God gives them a commandment not to eat the fruit (Gen. 2:17). It was man's responsibility to believe in God's Word and follow it. However, they disregarded God's Word, ate the fruit anyway, and were driven from Eden as a result. Note that God did not intervene to stop their downfall, even though He could have easily done so. Why did God give man free will and the ability to choose? It is because we were not created to be robots or automatons. Along with that freedom comes a certain moral responsibility, and God will not, under any circumstances, interfere with our human responsibility.
Another source of misunderstanding about God is the concept of omniscience. God supposedly knows everything--past, present, and future. Is this true? We may well assume that God knows everything concerning the past, down to the last detail. It stands to reason that God knows all things in the present as well; but what about the future? The fact is, not even God knows the future with absolute certainty! That is because we human beings were given free will and responsibility. If our free will is genuine, then there is no way God can know in advance what our choices will be. It's conceivable that God knows all possible outcomes, but which becomes reality is entirely up to us.
Everything outlined above, it seems, raises a serious question about the essential goodness, or benevolence of God. If God is good, why is there so much suffering in the world and why doesn't God do something about it? Human suffering falls into two main categories: a) that which is inflicted by the natural world, and b) that which we inflict upon each other. I will discuss them both.
The first source of human hardship comes from the natural world and includes such things as natural disasters, infectious disease, dangerous animals, and so on. Should God be blamed for this? Natural disasters result from the laws of physics that govern matter, and these laws are indifferent to the welfare of any living organism. Nature itself displays a similar indifference; in fact, 99% of all species that have ever existed on earth are now extinct. As conducive as nature is toward life, it is equally harsh and exacting. Reconciling this fact with God's goodness isn't easy and requires some speculation. My theory is that the Creator purposely made the universe to be tough, challenging, even dangerous. To survive and prosper in this world requires an investment of toil and effort. Human beings must be prepared to endure environmental hardships and overcome them. Why is this more to our advantage than a "soft" universe where everything is easy and no effort is needed? It is for the sake of our spiritual and intellectual development. If this world were too easy, human society would be hopelessly stagnant and moribund.
A much more troubling issue, however, is the misery that human beings inflict on one another--what we commonly refer to as "evil." Why doesn't God do something about evil? As stated, God gave man free will and responsibility, and God has an absolute rule against interfering with our human responsibility. This is the deep reason that God does not intervene to halt the evil activities of corrupt people. Does that mean that God will do nothing? Not at all, in fact God feels responsible to help suffering humanity. But it must be understood that God's work is positive in nature. Instead of intervening with evil*, God raises up spiritual and religious leaders to educate and rehabilitate men--historical figures such as Moses, Confucius, Lao Tzu, Buddha, Jesus, even philosophers like Socrates. God seeks to have men fulfill their moral responsibility by believing in and following these leaders. Ultimately, it is man himself who must put an end to evil; God will not do it for us. God may very well "show" the way, but we ourselves must put forth the effort to accomplish it.
*That's not to say that God never intervenes. There may be circumstances where God can and does "protect" us, but if He does, how will we ever know? He will not announce His deeds or take out newspaper ads describing what He has done. Moreover, it is impossible to know all the things that didn't happen, but would have but for the existence of God. For example, why has there not been a nuclear war? Such a war could destroy all life on earth, but "something" appears to be preventing it. I believe that "something" is God.
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Reverends Robertson and Falwell RevisitedHappened to catch both of these guys on television yesterday-- but considering where I live (southeast Virginia), it's a little hard to get away from them. Especially Pat Robertson, whose opinions are considered almost a gospel-unto-itself in certain Evangelical circles. Jerry Falwell was seemingly contrite, admitting that he had "screwed up" by issuing his ill-advised comments after Sept. 11. What is unclear is whether he regrets having said in public what he privately believes, or that he was just plain wrong. I suspect the former. At the time, I was somewhat bemused by the list of items Falwell attributed to offending God, among them "secular humanism" and "non-Christian religions." Imagine that! America offers safe haven, not only to every stripe of Christianity, but to Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, or what have you-- this offends God.
Robertson, however, reiterated his views on the matter, stating that God had "withdrawn His mantle of protection and anointing," thereby bringing on the terror attacks. He made his own list of offenses that presumably convinced God to do this, among them "sodomy" and "adultery" and "beastiality." But topping Robertson's list-- the #1 reason America has offended God-- was "witchcraft"! I guess that Harry Potter movie is proof of this.
Needless to say, hearing this sort of thing makes me cringe. I know in my guts it is WRONG, but why is it wrong? Where's the fallacy?
First, to say that God "lifted His mantle of protection" is to make God complicit in mass murder. God is our Parent, we are His children. That mantle of protection is similar to, say, the child-resistant cap on a medicine bottle. Suppose you get so angry with your child that you say, "I'll lift my mantle of protection," and unfasten the bottle cap. If the child dies as a result, that's felony child endangerment, or even murder. To say that God deliberately withdrew His "protection" and thousands of people died as a result-- you might as well claim that God hijacked the jets and aimed them at the World Trade Center Himself.
Second, exactly when did God withdraw His protection? On September 10, 2001 did He suddenly decide, "I've had enough"? This protection is supposed to protect Americans from foreign invaders? Where was the protection when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor? Where was it during the War of 1812 when British troops sacked Washington DC and burned most of our public buildings, including the Capitol? Where was it during the Revolutionary War when Redcoats committed atrocities against unarmed Americans?
Third, who exactly is this mantle of protection supposed to shield-- all Americans or only the privileged few? Why didn't it protect black Americans from 400 years of slavery, and subsequent years of mistreatment by whites? I guess only white folks can benefit from it. And why did God not protect Native Americans from near-extinction? Must be because they weren't Christians. What about religious minorities-- Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and most recently Muslims-- all these have had their share of persecution and abuse.
I'll not argue that America is not richly blessed by God or the subject of His anointing. America-- regardless of how "sinful" it is at the moment*-- is God's shining hope for the future. And there is such a thing as His "mantle of protection," no doubt about it. I've experienced it many times in my life of faith. Those who violate God's Law will suffer deleterious effects, that is also clear. But no action on God's part, either positive or negative, is responsible for this. Reverends Robertson and Falwell may rejoice in their belief that God is "expressing His wrath" by allowing terrorists to attack, but explain this to me: among those who died horribly on 9/11 were small children (mostly passengers on the jets). Does God really exercise His wrath by wiping out little kids? Actually, the whole notion of "God's wrath" is a throwback from paganism, when God was equated to natural forces. In Christianity there is no God of Wrath.
As I said, the notion of God as a "God of Wrath"-- punishing the wicked for their sins-- seems to be a leftover from prehistoric pagan religions. At that time, natural forces were thought to be agencies of the gods; natural disasters-- floods, hurricanes, drought, earthquakes, etc-- happened because the gods were angered. Religious rituals were designed to appease the capricious deities. And indeed, the Old Testament is filled with this type of primitive rhetoric. But Jesus introduced God as a Father, a loving Parent of all humanity, and the idea of God as a Parent is quite at odds with traditional beliefs that encouraged people to "fear" God and His wrath. In fact, it is contradictory: God cannot simultaneously be a Parent and a vengeful Deity to be feared. What follows are the several reasons I can think of that God does not exercise His wrath or pass judgment on sinners:
First, God is Just: if God should exercise His wrath and punish evildoers, He would have to distribute His justice equally. Why would he discriminate between one sinner and another? From God's perspective, comparing one person to another is like comparing anthills. Thus we would all be judged. Most likely, the whole human race would be wiped out in an instant. I doubt God could bear the grief of having to do this.
Second, there is that sticky provision of non-interference in the affairs of men. God limits Himself to guiding people in their growth, the rest is our responsibility. Punishing sinners would definitely be a form of interference. And strictly speaking, since it is man who committed the error of the fall and brought the fallen world, it is our responsibility to liquidate evil. Furthermore, after studying theology and philosophy for 25 years, I have yet to see any provision that posits God in that fearsome light. He is the Creator, manifesting only what is good.
Third, it is unnecessary: just as natural law governs the external world, God's Law governs the inner world; its action is quite automatic. Those who violate it will gradually destroy themselves. Evil is a form of slow suicide. Only the good-- i.e. obedient to God's Law-- will remain. So God really has no need to punish sinners-- their own actions will do them in.
Last, it is beneath God's Dignity: this is, without a doubt, the most profound reason. God never envisioned Himself in such a hateful role as that of Judge. God does not want to be known as a God of wrath and punishment. He wants to be known as a God of Love. A God of wrath should be feared; but that which you fear, you will eventually come to loathe. To have to judge all humanity and send people to hell would be degrading and humiliating, extremely so. Men may rejoice in power and the use of force in dominating others, but God rejoices only in love. He wants to be the source and center of love for all eternity. That is His Dignity.
What then, is the problem with believing in the "God of Wrath"? If people think that God is so fearsome, visiting death and destruction upon the "unrighteous," then it is but a small step for some unbalanced individuals to want to take "God's work" into their own hands. This is precisely why we wind up with this Muslim Jihad against the United States. They perceive America as that "Great Satan" and are only doing God a favor by attacking us. Americans do not understand the allure of Jihad to the Islamic culture; it appeals to their deepest religious instincts. That's why an accurate understanding of God's true nature is desperately needed.
*In reality, I believe that America's "moral decay" is more a mass media phenomenon than anything else. The USA is probably no better or worse than any other nation in this regard.
***
When Science Goes Too FarOne of the more enduring images from the golden age of horror movies is that of the mad scientist--like Dr. Frankenstein creating a monster out of purloined body parts. Despite the obvious gifts to humanity from science (whose excesses seem negligible by comparison), there has always been a question at the back of people's minds: will science someday go too far? Speculation on this theme provides the fodder for much popular fiction and movie fare, yet it is based on an uncomfortable reality. For example, when physicists unlocked the secrets of the atomic nucleus, what resulted? A nuclear arms race and the threat of annihilating all life on earth. In 1932 Aldous Huxley's Brave New World warned about the dangers of tampering with the chemistry of life, but at the time his tale of identical human beings conceived in test tubes and born in hatcheries must have seemed rather far-fetched. Thirty years later, however, biochemist James Watson and physicist Francis Crick finally worked out the structure of the deoxyribonucleic acid molecule (DNA)--the key to heredity and biological reproduction--and suddenly it seemed the Brave New World would soon be upon us.
Whatever one's opinion of such controversial topics as cloning, genetic engineering, or DNA testing may be, one thing is certain: the DNA genie cannot be put back in the bottle. Should scientists therefore be allowed to proceed as they wish, without a word of caution from anyone? I think not. Dorothy Nelkin, in her article "The Grandiose Claims of Geneticists," takes some to task for "using overblown rhetoric and misleading metaphors to convey the importance of their work" (586). For instance, in an attempt to reassure an uneasy public as to the virtues of the Human Genome Project--an ambitious undertaking to map out human DNA completely--they have resorted to religious imagery, calling the genome "The Bible" or the "Holy Grail" (Nelkin 586). As a result, the news media has consistently distorted the nature of genetic research, assigning to genes such properties as identity: "We came from chemistry" (qtd. in Watson 590), and the ability to predict behavioral patterns: "our fate is in our genes" (qtd. in Nelkin 586). Much of this claptrap is swallowed hook, line, and sinker by a gullible public, who are, understandably, mystified by the science. But I contend, along with Nelkin, that such language reveals nothing but the hubris of scientists. The exaggerated claims of geneticists, then, are based on the false assumption that life itself is no more than chemistry, and this follows the tendency of science in general to reduce all natural phenomena to material processes alone.
The science of microbiology is, admittedly, an esoteric one, so it's not surprising that scientists would be mesmerized by the complexity of it all. In his book Beginnings Isaac Asimov points out that all plant and animal life is multicellular--that is, comprised of billions of living cells (174). Each cell has a tiny nucleus embedded within a translucent material called cytoplasm. Inside the nucleus are granules of chromatin, which, in the process of mitosis (cell division) form thread-like strands, or chromosomes. These chromosomes double in number, move to opposite ends of the cell, which then divides into two daughter cells. This is an example of asexual reproduction, which is characteristic of micro-organisms. Cells with the structure described above are called eukaryotes. Bacteria, on the other hand, which are 10 to 100 times smaller than eukaryotes and do not have a nucleus, are called prokaryotes. A virus, in contrast, is far smaller and much simpler than even the tiniest prokaryote.Viruses are nucleoproteins--an association of protein molecules and nucleic acid. Since these are the smallest known forms of life, this arrangement seems to be the bare essence of organic matter.
Within the chromosome (or virus) the amount of protein varies while that of the nucleic acid remains constant. The protein is what determines the shape, structure, and function of the cell. In other words, what makes a brain cell different from a stomach cell or liver cell? The protein content. Protein molecules are polymers, having the same basic structure as plastic or rubber (Asimov 220). But whereas an ordinary polymer is quite simple, consisting of one or two interlocking units, a protein molecule may have as many as 20 components, known as amino acids, and each of these may be present in any molecule. Restricting a molecule to one of each of the 20, the number of possible arrangements--and thus different molecules--is a staggering two-billion billion (Asimov 221). Consider the hemoglobin molecule. It has 539 amino acids, and according to Asimov:
The number of different arrangements in which we can place those hundreds of amino acids is equivalent to a 1 followed by 620 zeroes. The number of all the subatomic particles in the entire universe is virtually zero compared to this mighty number. Yet for hemoglobin to work properly only one arrangement is wanted. A mistake in a single amino acid in hemoglobin can produce a molecule that works with dangerous imperfection. (220)
But for all the complexity of proteins, it is the nucleic acid that is central to life. There are two varieties: DNA and RNA. Both of these are composed of relatively simple nucleotides, of which there are four types, abbreviated as A,G,C, and T (A,G,C, and U in RNA). These are arranged in double-helix configurations within the chromosome fragments (genes). The four nucleotides control the production and synthesis of the 20 amino acids in proteins by forming triplets--AAA, AAG, AAC, and so on. DNA is remarkable in that it is self-replicating--an ability proteins do not have. In the process of mitosis the double helices unwind and separate, then each helix forms a copy of itself. The two new helices form the basis of the two new cells. In essence, DNA is an information store and control center determining the protein content of cells. The number of different proteins that can be created this way is seemingly infinite (which accounts for the incredible diversity of life on earth), but it is all controlled by the comparatively simple DNA molecule.
The question now arises: is DNA equivalent to life itself? A great many scientists seem to think so, as Nelkin's article indicates. But what is DNA, after all? As explained above, it is composed of four nucleotides. The nucleotides are made up of only five elements: carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and occasionally, sulfur. Any of these base elements by themselves, or any chemical compound they might form (water, carbon dioxide, ammonia, etc.) are definitely non-living matter. How then can a simple rearrangement of atoms to form a nucleotide be considered life? DNA cannot work without proteins, and proteins can do nothing without receiving instructions from DNA. Common sense would tell us that life is an impossibility, yet it exists. What is the relationship between "life" and DNA? DNA can be compared to a radio receiver. One turns on the radio to enjoy a bit of classical music, a Beethoven symphony, say. Does the music originate from the receiver? No, the receiver simply picks up the radio wave and converts it to electronic impulses which are fed to the speaker. Similarly, DNA is a molecule designed to transmit the intangible life-force. The life-force locks DNA and proteins together, working through them and expressing itself through them. But to think that DNA is life itself is tantamount to believing the Chicago Philharmonic Orchestra somehow resides within a Kenwood receiver.
What we need is a clear definition of the term "human being." If it's true, as materialist doctrine holds, that nothing exists other than atoms and void, then we very well may have "come from chemistry." But does mere chemistry define humanity? What random mix of swirling atoms produces a Michelangelo, a Socrates, or a Jesus? From a Biblical perspective, man has an inner essence--a spirit or soul that is immaterial. Genesis 2:7 says: "then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being." Therefore, the subject of genetic research is nothing but an external form (which does consist of atoms and void), but the whole human being is much more than a physical body. All this points to a fundamental flaw in scientific reasoning: it cannot take into account any intangible, such as mind, spirit, thought, or what have you. Such elements, real though they be (with tangible, observable effects on matter), are beyond the scope of science. For example, what is love? What are ideas? What is intuition? These things are not made of atoms and molecules, neither are they energy (like electromagnetism). They are intangibles. Thus, stubborn insistence on "empirical data" alone as the source of knowledge can lead to a kind of intellectual blindness among scientists.
According to philosopher William James, "If everything, man included, is the mere effect of the primitive nebula or the infinite substance, what becomes of moral responsibility, freedom of action, individual effort, and aspiration?" (qtd. in Frost 50). Modern science, in other words, seems to destroy all that makes human life human (Frost 50). Unfortunately, we all possess an enormous capacity for self-deception, and even the most intelligent among us can sometimes be quite irrational. Scientists in particular are notoriously unwilling to accept a paradigm shift. Thus, when Linus Pauling says that we came from chemistry, he is expressing an article of faith, not scientific fact. Scientists are no more immune to hopeless dreams, wishful thinking, or outlandish ideas than anyone else. How else does one explain, for example, the late Carl Sagan's Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence project (SETI)? There is not a shred of evidence to support belief in alien intelligence, yet many reputable scientists stake their careers on it.
Now perhaps we can debate the merits (or lack thereof) of genetic research with a modicum of detachment. The opinions of educated laymen are invaluable because, frankly, those whose lives are wrapped up in a discipline, be it science, religion, academia, or whatever, are often too personally involved to be objective. No one has a monopoly on truth, and I have a hard time thinking that life is nothing more than the result of random forces and chemicals. If that is the contention of supposedly learned men, then science has gone too far.
Works CitedAsimov, Isaac. Beginnings: The Story of Origins--of Mankind, Life, the Earth, the Universe. New York: Berkley, 1989.
Frost Jr. S.E. Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers: A Survey of their Basic Ideas. New York: Dolphin, 1942.
Nelkin, Dorothy. "The Grandiose Claims of Geneticists." Rpt. in Writing and Reading Across the Curriculum, 6th ed. Eds. Laurence Behrens and Leonard J. Rosen. New York: Longman, 1997. 584-588.
Watson, James D. "The Human Genome Project: A Personal View." Rpt. in Writing and Reading Across the Curriculum, 6th ed. Eds. Laurence Behrens and Leonard J. Rosen. New York: Longman, 1997. 589-596.
***
AIDS: Biological Warfare or the Judgment of God?The onset of AIDS as a worldwide epidemic during the past twenty years has sparked a number of controversies in the public arena, which is something outbreaks of disease rarely do. For example, we might deplore the spread of tuberculosis, but there is little to argue about there. AIDS arouses a host of medical, political, psychological, and religious issues that are not easily resolved. Why the controversy? What is there to argue about? It is because of the way HIV is spread--primarily through behaviors which society frowns on. The exception, of course, would be those who become infected through no fault of their own--recipients of blood transfusions or otherwise inadvertently infected. This category is an increasingly tiny minority thanks to effective blood-screening procedures and other protective measures. The vast majority get HIV either through sexual contact or intravenous drug use. The fact that AIDS is a deadly, non-curable disease--one that kills with excruciating slowness--produces the characteristic air of hysteria. In many ways, AIDS is the "black plague" of the modern era. But is it "the Judgment of God" on sinners, as many Christians believe, or is it simply a natural phenomenon, an example of what might be considered biological warfare?
Sociologists believe that religion began thousands of years ago as primitive man tried to explain natural phenomena. Thus, there was a sun god, a moon god, a wind god, a river god, or what have you. The forces of nature are not always kind, and this resulted in a fear of the "gods," which developed into rituals designed to appease--some of them involving things like human sacrifice. The common thinking was that when disaster struck--when there was a flood, drought, earthquake, pestilence--one must have "offended the gods." Conversely, when good things happened, the gods were pleased.
However, if that was the full extent of it, if there were nothing more than superstition and foolishness involved, all traces of religion would have vanished long ago. Religion has an unseen, intangible aspect, a moral component that resonates with man's inner being. Therefore, no matter how far science advances, world religions do not diminish. Science, which deals exclusively with the physical world, cannot address the spiritual and moral concerns of human beings. Contrary to popular belief, not all scientists are atheists; many are practicing members of one faith or another.
A major shift in religion's development occurred with the rise of the Jewish people. The religious practice depicted in the book of Genesis seems to differ little from other local varieties. But with Moses and the Ten Commandments, religion goes from being a set of prescribed rituals to a moral code. The "thou shalts" and "shalt nots" of the Commandments have nothing to do with ritual. Nevertheless, there is still plenty of incentive to appease the "jealous" God of the Old Testament. Indeed, whenever the children of Israel stray from righteousness, plagues befall them.
Christianity introduced an even higher standard. Whereas the Old Testament relationship between God and man was master-servant, Jesus taught that God was a Father and human beings His children. The struggle between his new vision of God, professed by the few that followed him, and the traditional view of the majority--who stubbornly clung to their old, comfortable beliefs--eventually resulted in his death. Apparently, the world was not ready for a God of love.
The point is, there has always been a struggle between "old" and "new" in religious thought. Christianity has developed tremendously in 2000 years and many of the great moral dilemmas have been resolved. But the enlightened view always seems to be in the minority. The majority of Christians, unfortunately, are stuck in a netherworld somewhere between the Old Testament and New. Hence, the rise of fundamentalism. In fundamentalism ignorance achieves new heights as believers zealously insist that the words of the Bible, written thousands of years ago, are literally true. For example, no matter how much scientific evidence may be amassed proving the earth to be more than four billion years old, the fundamentalist holds that the earth is no more than 6000 years old and was created in six days. Some even think that the sun revolves around the earth--which is dead still at the center of the universe. They believe that the miracles in the Bible occurred exactly as described--no matter how impossible. Most incredible of all, they believe that the events depicted in the book of Revelation (regarded as a symbolist piece by scholars) will happen literally. Amazingly enough, this medieval viewpoint is alive and well in A.D. 2000. It's even gaining ground. Is it any wonder, then, that such thinking would persist in calling AIDS "the Judgment of God"?
If AIDS is the Judgment of God, then I ask:
• Why do "innocent" people get the disease? Examples: blood transfusion recipients, infants born of HIV positive mothers, etc.
• Why is it that not everyone who indulges in "immoral" activity gets infected? HIV still infects a minority.
• Why are there non-progressors? How do these people get HIV but never develop AIDS? Why are they allowed to "cheat" God?
• Why now? If God wanted to wipe out sinners, why didn't He do it centuries ago? Homosexuality, promiscuity, drug abuse--none of these things are new.
• Why does the Almighty need a virus to do His work? Why not just strike sinners dead with His supernatural powers?
In other words, the idea that AIDS is Divine Retribution is pure bullshit.
From a scientific perspective, the outbreak of AIDS is just another example of what might be considered biological warfare. The vast, unseen world of micro-organisms is the foundation of all other life. All plants and animals on earth today are multicellular, each organism being composed of countless cells. Yet, multicellular is a relatively recent development. Life has existed on earth for about four billion years, but the first multicelled organisms did not appear until 800 million years ago. If we compare the age of the earth to one solar year*--January 1 to December 31--then 800 million years ago corresponds to about mid-October. Life didn't even begin to creep from the oceans onto dry land until December of our "year." Human beings have only been on earth since 11:00 PM on December 31, and all of man's recorded history has occurred within the final minute--from 11:59 PM. So most of life's history on earth--an unimaginable stretch of time--has been the story of micro-organisms. In that world, the struggle for food, procreation, and survival is just as vigorous as the most savage African jungle.
All the cells that make up plant, animal, and human bodies are called eukaryotes. Eukaryotes contain a tiny nucleus embedded deep within. Surrounding it is a gelatinous substance called cytoplasm, and all of it is enclosed in a membrane called the "cell wall." The production of enzymes, which regulates the life functions of the cell, is controlled by the nucleus. A eukaryotic cell, however, represents a high order of life on the evolutionary scale. They first appeared about one billion years ago (late August on our scale).
A much more primitive kind of life are prokaryotes. These are bacteria--10 to 100 times smaller than eukaryotes and lacking a nucleus. They do contain DNA and RNA, however, which is all the necessary genetic material. Eukaryotes evolved from prokaryotes, just as multicelled organisms evolved from single-celled. In fact, prokaryotes can almost be regarded as independent, self-sufficient nuclei. They first appeared about three billion years ago (mid-April on our scale).
The core of these micro-organisms is the genetic material, or chromosomes. Within the chromosome fragments, or genes, lies the DNA. DNA (or RNA) is composed of nucleic acid--called nucleotides. The DNA is both a storehouse of information and a "control center," directing the production of proteins and enzymes. A virus, thousands of times smaller than a typical prokaryote, consists simply of DNA (or RNA) and a protein coat. There is some debate about whether these things are even truly "alive." For example, a virus can be frozen solid or dehydrated, and stored seemingly forever. But when thawed it can resume its life cycle. Viruses lack the ability to procreate on their own; they are by nature parasites that must invade a cell and take over its enzyme production to create new viruses. These simple organisms first appeared about 3.8 billion years ago (early February on our scale).
Viruses may almost be considered detached chromosomes that have somehow
developed a parasitic way of survival. If prokaryotes evolved from viruses (they had to have come from somewhere), they could not be the viruses of today. Today's viruses may even have "de-volved" in reverse manner, shedding unnecessary material in favor of a more fecund way of life.
The warfare being waged in the microverse is even more ruthless than what we observe in our world. And it has been going on far longer. Viruses prey upon prokaryotes and eukaryotes; prokaryotes prey upon eukaryotes and multicelled organisms; multicelled organisms prey upon each other. It's all a seemingly mindless struggle for procreation and survival. That's all HIV is, nothing more.
In conclusion I must draw attention to two inescapable facts: 1) the existence of HIV is no one's fault--it is a natural phenomenon. And its introduction into the human population may also be no one's fault; however, 2) the fact that HIV and AIDS has become an epidemic is due entirely to the reckless and irresponsible behavior of human beings. We have no one to blame but ourselves.
Although everyone agrees that intravenous drug use is a form of slow suicide, there may be some controversy over sexual practices. Traditional--that is, religious--morality insists on abstinence before marriage and strict monogamy afterward. If this moral standard were rigorously and universally practiced, there would not be an AIDS epidemic. Although Christianity advocates this morality, it doesn't offer any concrete reason for it. It's almost as if God wants us to deny basic human nature. However, I would argue that aside from the spiritual costs of immorality--broken marriages, damage to children, etc.--there are also biological hazards. If there is a Creator, then He created the microverse and knows full well the dangers inherent in it. Thus, a commandment like "Thou shalt not commit adultery" may be for the sake of our physiological, as well as spiritual, protection. But how could the ancients have known that?
Ethical codes exist for our protection. Those who violate them are putting themselves at risk. If one goes to the top of the Empire State building, one will find guard rails. Their purpose is not to restrict our "freedom" but to protect us. If a person ignores the guard rails, jumps over them, then slips and falls to his doom, is that the "Judgment of God"? No, that's gravity. Therefore, let's not blame God for our own recklessness.
*See "Measuring the Age of the Earth."
***
Legislating Morality1. The Harm PrincipleFirst, as in all philosophical discourse, we need to define our terms. What exactly do we mean by "morality"? My dictionary equates it to "virtue," standards of behavior that conform to "principles of right and wrong," and so forth. There are two basic categories we may consider: a) morality as a matter of individual conscience, and b) what we might call "public morality"--i.e. ethical standards that are commonly accepted among a people, whether a nation (like the United States), a private organization (like the Methodist Church), a traditional tribal group (like the Cherokee Indians), or a family unit (yours or mine). I suggest that part of the dilemma about whether "morality" should be legislated involves a failure to distinguish matters of private conscience from those of public mores (although it is extremely difficult to see either as wholly separate from the other). By "legislation," we are referring to acts of law-making bodies, such as the U.S. Congress or Virginia Assembly. So, to what extent, then, should a law-making body attempt to regulate the moral choices of its citizens? Consider John Stuart Mill's "harm principle":
"Mill proposes what he describes as a 'very simple principle' as being 'entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control'. The principle asserted that 'The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others'... Mill's 'harm principle' has sometimes been taken to suggest an atomistic view of society such that there is an area of private conduct which does not impinge on others at all, and which falls outside the law's proper domain for that reason. As his critics were quick to point out, only the most trivial actions are devoid of effects upon others."
What are some examples of private conscience? The most fundamental is probably religious belief. From the standpoint of American law, at least, whether one believes in God, practices a religion, is an atheist or an agnostic, or none of the above, is not an item that can be legislated. But in medieval Europe (and in some parts of colonial America, for that matter), religious faith was compulsory--"heresy" could get you burned at the stake. In Afghanistan under the Taliban one religious faith or another was mandatory; citizens had to register their affiliations with the authorities. Under Islamic law, apostasy is a crime punishable by death. Other examples of private conscience might include such things as use of drugs, tobacco, alcohol, or sexual practices between consenting adults. But in every case, arguments can be made on both sides as to whether this act or that "harms" another person, thus the criticism of Mill:
"A number of other serious problems are associated with the harm principle. One question concerns the compatibility of the principle with Mill's commitment to utilitarianism. For should not a utilitarian legislator take account of all of the effects of an action, before deciding upon its prohibition? If some people suffer deep unhappiness at the very thought of acts of which they disapprove being performed in private, how can this unhappiness be justifiably ignored from the viewpoint of utility? It has been suggested that a utilitarian legislator should disregard such unhappiness in so far as it flows from the adoption of nonutilitarian moral views."
Like every other abstract theory, utilitarianism does not translate well to the real world. Just because it looks good on paper does not mean that it's practical or feasible. When Congress passes a law, for instance, there follows the problem of enforcing it. My favorite example of this is the Prohibition. The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified in 1919, outlawed alcoholic beverages in the United States. Ultimately, however, the Prohibition failed because it was unenforceable. Far from instilling greater morality in the nation, what it really did was create an environment for organized crime to flourish in. Thus, it was repealed in 1933. Many laws have been written concerning the "private" lives of consenting adults, some of which may still be on the books, but how do you enforce them? Do we form a morality police to spy on people's bedrooms? Like the Prohibition, the cure turns out to be worse than the disease.
2. Positive and Critical MoralityOne way we can clarify this debate is to consider the distinction between positive and critical morality: "Positive" morality is specific to a certain group. Let's consider it as defined by the Roman Catholic Church. In this case, by referencing canon law and statements of the Pope (or previous popes), it is not too difficult to arrive at a clear definition of what is "moral" vs. "immoral": a ban on premarital or extramarital sex, divorce not permitted, birth control strongly discouraged, no female clergy, abortion not allowed, and so on. But the curious thing is to look in history to a time when virtually everyone believed this type of morality had to be enforced--upon pain of death if necessary. In colonial Virginia, for example, there were laws on the books making "heresy" a crime [this example refers to the Anglican Church, but the principle is the same]. Heresy would be something like refusing to acknowledge the Trinity. Thus, if you publicly refused to acknowledge the tripartite God, you could be prosecuted and a) be excluded from holding public office, b) lose your property, c) lose custody of your children, d) spend three years in jail without bond, or e) be burned at the stake (Randall, 1993, p.198). How's that for "enforcing morality"? Similarly, positive morality could be of the Islamic brand, Taliban style. Thus, such things as watching western movies, listening to secular radio, wearing "non-Islamic" dress, dancing, playing chess, refusing to register your religious affiliation with authorities, appearing in public clean shaven (for men), appearing in public without a veil (for women), etc., were violations of law and strictly enforced. So how do you criticize or condemn these practices on a moral basis? Through critical morality. According to Hart:
"It is salutary to inquire precisely what it is that is prima facie objectionable in the legal enforcement of morality; for the idea of legal enforcement is in fact less simple than is often assumed. It has two different but related aspects. One is the actual punishment of the offender. This characteristically involves depriving him of liberty of movement or of property or of association with family or friends, or the infliction upon him of physical pain or even death. All these are things which are assumed to be wrong to inflict on others without special justification, and in fact they are so regarded by the law and morality of all developed societies. To put it as a lawyer would, these are things which, if they are not justified as sanctions, are delicts or wrongs" (1988, p.44).
Critical morality takes positive morality to task, and for good reason: one man's morality is another man's witch-hunt or Inquisition. Consider the precepts of positive morality--the Roman Catholic version, say--in relation to what Hart pointed out above. Enforcing the Catholic canon through legislative acts would result in any number of outrages. Premarital sex might be a misdemeanor while adultery would be a felony; divorce would be unobtainable, use of contraceptives a misdemeanor, and abortion a capital crime. Misdemeanors can result in fines, probation, and up to 12 months in jail; felonies can result in fines, probation, and more than 12 months in a state correctional facility; and a capital crime, of course, can bring the death penalty. Is this how we want to treat "immoral" people who cannot control their sexual urges, choose not to have children (even when married), or go so far as to abort a pregnancy? However contemptible some behaviors might be--e.g. the man who cheats on his wife (or vice versa)--it is very difficult to argue that such persons are a danger to society and should be incarcerated. The punishments that the state inflicts on offenders are quite severe and must be morally justified. Suppose a woman is raped and becomes pregnant; suppose she gets an illegal abortion because she cannot bear the thought of having the child; suppose she is caught, prosecuted, and convicted? Now she sits on death row, waiting to be executed. I submit that the "justice" deigned by the state is morally unjustified. That's why we have a secular government in the United States and most western countries.
The second aspect of legal enforcement, discussed by Hart, is more diffuse than the first:
"[It] bears on those who may never offend against the law, but are coerced into obedience by the threat of legal punishment. This rather than physical restrictions is what is normally meant in the discussion of political arrangements by restrictions on liberty. Such restrictions, it is to be noted, may be thought of as calling for justification for several quite distinct reasons. The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice may be held a value in itself with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere; or it may be thought valuable because it enables individuals to experiment--even with living--and to discover things valuable both to themselves and to others" (1988, p.45).
This might be understood in terms of "specific deterrence" and "normative validation." In other words, society has a vested interest in punishing or deterring certain behaviors (e.g. murder, larceny, fraud, etc.) while rewarding their opposites--that is, if one's continued liberty can be called a "reward." By punishing unlawful actions society validates desired, or lawful, actions. So long as we have limited government, one that does not inveigle itself into every private corner of citizen's lives, specific deterrence and normative validation can be justified. But where government becomes too powerful, either through extreme political ideology (as in Nazi Germany) or through a fusion of church and state (as in modern day Iran), it becomes increasingly difficult to justify either concept. For one thing, it enforces conformity to some desired standard; and where the standard is unrealistic, doctrinaire, or irrational, it is tantamount to slavery if enshrined in law. Nazi Germany had this ideal of the ubermensch¬--or "superman"--which was supposed to be the heritage of the Aryan Race: six-foot tall, blonde, blue eyes, muscular physique, intellectually superior, etc. Nazi eugenics aimed at "purifying" the bloodlines so that this type of German would rule all Europe (and the U.S. too if WWII had gone the other way). According to Hitler, "inferior" races were fit only for menial labor. Point is, under such horrific conditions it is impossible for human ingenuity and innovation to assert itself, for these things thrive only in an atmosphere of freedom. Hart continues:
"But interference with individual liberty may be thought an evil requiring justification for simpler, utilitarian reasons; for it is itself the infliction of a special form of suffering--often very acute--on those whose desires are frustrated by the fear of punishment. This is of particular importance in the case of laws enforcing a sexual morality. They may create misery of a quite special degree. For both the difficulties involved in the repression of sexual impulses and the consequences of repression are quite different from those involved in the abstention from 'ordinary' crime. Unlike sexual impulses, the impulse to steal or to wound or even kill is not, except in a minority of mentally abnormal cases, a recurrent and insistent part of daily life" (ibid).
There is a distinct difference between the criminal and non-criminal personality, he seems to be saying. The former is considered "abnormal." We're not talking about the person who may, in a moment of rage, have to suppress his desire to injure or kill another person; nor are we talking about the individual who may be tempted to steal a desired object if he sees the chance of getting away with it. We are talking precisely about those individuals who lack such controls: that is the source of the so-called abnormality. Most people have sufficient self-control, or may have no proclivities in that area at all, due to the ability to empathize with other human beings. Which is the basis for the Golden Rule: how would you like it if someone did that to YOU? But unlike truly criminal behaviors, everyone has to deal with sexual urges. Part of the reason is biological, for the unconscious urge to procreate the species overrides just about all other concerns. Sex urges can be compared to other desires, like that for food, sleep, or shelter. Those may be necessary for the individual, but sexual reproduction is absolutely essential if humankind is to avoid extinction. This may be part of the reason why many people foolishly bring ruin upon themselves so that they can satisfy their urges. There is such a thing as sexual pathology, of course, but the main reason western culture has moved away from criminalizing private sexual practices between consenting adults is humanitarian in nature. If you happen to have your life "under control" in that regard, you are to be commended; but let's have a measure of compassion for those who do not. That is why I, for example, refused to condemn former President Bill Clinton for his indiscretions. His accusers sounded shrill and uncompassionate to me, not to mention hypocritical.
3. Challenging the Harm Principle[A]Although J.S. Mill's "Harm Principle" would argue otherwise, there are justifications for outlawing prostitution and homosexuality. First, we should consider the fact that "illegal" does not always coincide with "immoral." For example, sexual relations between husband and wife are not considered immoral--neither by law nor religious tradition. But if a married couple should have these relations publicly, in the middle of Times Square, say, they would be arrested and charged with public indecency (at the very least). Thus, even though the act itself could hardly be called "immoral," it is offensive if performed in public. Similarly, regardless of one's opinion about such things as prostitution or homosexuality, it is clear that open displays of these behaviors are offensive to public mores. For this reason they should be controlled by law. According to Feinberg:
"In its untechnical, prelegal sense, the word 'obscenity' refers to material dealing with nudity, sex, or excretion in an offensive manner. Such material becomes obscene in the legal sense when, because of its offensiveness or some other reason... it is or ought to be without legal protection. The legal definition then incorporates the everyday sense, and essential to both is the requirement that the material be offensive. An item may offend one person and not another. 'Obscenity,' if it is to avoid this subjective reality, must involve an interpretational objective sense of 'offensive.' Material must be offensive by prevailing community standards that are public and well known, or be such that it is apt to offend virtually everyone" (1988, p.61).
Here, the issue is not so much morality vs. immorality but one of public decorum. Some behaviors are acceptable in the public arena while others are not. It is, of course, a notoriously ethnocentric affair in making these determinations. For instance, in traditional Islamic societies women are not allowed in public without a male family-member escort. They have to wear the veils and long garments; nothing but eyes and hands are supposed to be visible. When foreign women visit these countries, clad in western-style clothing--even if it is conservative by our standards--Muslim men are deeply offended by this. Women who venture out alone or without their concealing garments are apt to be assaulted and spat upon. That's just the way it is there. In Oriental cultures women are expected to be subservient to men, almost like servants. That's why western women, especially Americans, are so offensive in their eyes. Not that I personally agree with any of this, but public decorum is something the law takes quite seriously. America is, in my opinion, much too permissive, and a lot of what I see in movies, on television, and in public is offensive to me. But even we have our standards. Most people agree that open displays of nudity (e.g. Janet Jackson at the Superbowl!), sexual activity, and so on, is offensive and should not be tolerated. At least, young children should not be exposed to it. Community standards prevail. To say that prostitution should be outlawed does not necessarily mean that it should be criminalized--that is, made into a felony--but it should not be tolerated in public. It is offensive to community standards, and whether you believe that it's "immoral" or not is beside the point. Similarly, homosexuality is quite offensive when publicly exhibited. Gay rights activists don't seem to comprehend this fact. They accuse the straight world of "bigotry" and insist that their lifestyle be accepted by one and all. They compare their plight to that of African-Americans during the Civil Rights struggle. That comparison, however, is based on a fallacy: Being born African-American (or any race) has nothing to do with morals. It's ontological--what type of being you happen to be. One's sexual practices, however, (homosexual, heterosexual, etc.) does not concern ontology but behavior. Sexual orientation (at least insofar as it's practiced) does involve morals. Thus, homosexuality can be considered just another perversion, like pedophilia or voyeurism.
[B]One of the problems with drug laws in the United States is the obvious discrimination between legal substances (alcohol and tobacco) and illegal ones (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, etc.)--all of which are clearly harmful. The damage to society--both in monetary and human costs--from the legal substances far outweigh those of the illegal, yet it is the illegal that stirs controversy. Such apparent hypocrisy undercuts any attempt to moralize about the evils of drug use. Is it primarily a public health problem or one for the criminal courts? This matter is obscured because of the violent and dangerous black market of drug trafficking. In countries like Columbia or Argentina drug cartels are powerful enough to threaten the government. It is conceivable that a cartel could amass such power as to stage a coup and become the government! But it is the illegality of cocaine and other products that helps create and maintain the black market. Drug trafficking and all the crime that goes with it is certainly a matter of public policy--and thus public morality; but what about the strictly private use of an illegal substance? On what basis do we argue against the use of, say, marijuana, as opposed to the use of alcohol? Both are harmful to the individual if used in excess; both pose legitimate public safety issues; both can wreak havoc on families and communities if abused. Marijuana has been criticized as a "gateway" drug that leads the user toward harder and more dangerous substances (which is quite true), but grass itself is a mild intoxicant that poses no immediate harm to the user. Alcohol, on the other hand, seems to be a gateway only to alcoholism, and an overdose can be lethal (every year in the news you read about some college student drinking himself to death at a party). Although Joel Fienberg's piece does not directly address drug use, he does see a difficulty in using laws to regulate private behaviors:
"Immoral conduct is no trivial thing, and we should hardly expect societies to tolerate it; yet if men are forced to refrain from immorality, their own choices will play very little role in what they do, so that they can hardly develop critical judgment and moral traits of a genuinely praiseworthy kind. Thus legal enforcement of morality seems to pose a dilemma. The problem does not arise if we assume that all immoral conduct is socially harmful, for immoral conduct will then be prohibited by law not just to punish sin or to 'force men to be moral,' but rather to prevent harm to others. If, however, there are forms of immorality that do not necessarily cause harm, 'the problem of the enforcement of morality' becomes especially acute" (1988, p.55).
My question: is legislation the proper instrument by which to secure private morality? It is certainly the instrument by which we maintain public safety and pursue goals deemed necessary by the collective. Thus, these dangerous substances should (and must) be regulated by legislation. But that does not mean they should be criminalized. I've already used the example of the Prohibition, so there's no need to go into it again. The real issue here is the extent of governmental power. Writing about society in normative terms means that it is easy to say "people shouldn't use dangerous drugs," or "people shouldn't drink excessively" (in fact, some people shouldn't drink at all). Similarly, you can say "husbands shouldn't cheat on their wives," or "parents shouldn't mistreat their children." Citing innumerable instances of social harm that results from all those activities, it is tempting to suggest maybe the law--that is, government--should step in and force people to behave like decent human beings. But should government be that powerful and invasive? Fact is, American law, based on English common law, is founded upon more libertarian principles. In essence, laws are written for the sake of the public welfare, not to inhibit the exercise of private conscience. "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" implies that governmental intrusion must be held to a minimum. What is the problem, then, with using law to regulate strictly private behavior--as in the example of our dope-smoker? First, it greatly increases the government's power, which is itself inherently dangerous (if you wish to live under a government that is nearly omnipotent, move to North Korea). Second, the value of human life is cheapened. Liberty means autonomy and the power to make one's own decisions; but it also means that some will make the wrong decisions. Without liberty, what do you have? Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Mao's China. Private morality, I contend, is the proper concern of religion, philosophy, and education, as well as the informal standards set by civil society. It should not be the State's concern.
4. Supreme Court Decisions[A]As is the case with drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms, the government may have a vested interest in regulating (not necessarily outlawing) obscenity, both in its graphic form (pornography) and its utterance. Indeed, these issues are currently being hotly debated in the public forum and in Congress. U2's Bono (real name Paul Hewson) uttered a few choice expletives during an awards show broadcast a few weeks ago, then there was the now infamous Janet Jackson (ahem) "wardrobe malfunction" at the Superbowl. A House Subcommittee has convened a hearing on "public decency," and legislation is pending to tightly regulate radio and television programming. It's understood that broadcast medium has to be under some governmental control--after all, any child in the nation can access it by switching on the TV or radio. But the proposed legislation also has provisions for cable programming as well. All this raises the ugly specter of censorship. The question is--what level of censorship is acceptable to the First Amendment's free speech guarantee?
I should point out, first of all, that free speech has its limits--not all speech is protected. For example, slander is prohibited by law, as is libel; inciting acts of violence is not protected speech; and as Roth v. United States (1957) points out, neither is obscenity:
"All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties [of the First Amendment], unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956."
The purpose of free speech is for the health of the republic, as Justice Brennan wrote in New York Times v. Sullivan, “[it] was fashioned to insure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people…” and that “[it] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” Free speech is thus more for the listener's benefit than the speaker's, in the sense that in a republic, the people should have unrestricted access to a wide variety of political, philosophical, theological, and every other type of opinion. This is reflected in our public libraries. Go into virtually any library in the United States and you will find copies of books like Mein Kampf by Adolph Hitler, and ¬The Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels. The ideas contained in these documents are contrary to everything the United States stands for, yet there they are, freely available to anyone who wants to read them. Do books like these have "even the slightest redeeming social importance"? I hold that they do. First, they provide a guidepost as to what we're trying to avoid in America: intolerance, racism, centralized authority. Second, they demonstrate the value of free exchange--that in the "war of words" the truth is bound to emerge. How can we know the truth without simultaneously knowing untruth? Propaganda means presenting one, and only one, side to the story. Even if your rhetoric represents the pristine truth, there must still be something to compare it to. For example, if you write an argumentative paper supportive of a thesis--even the world's greatest thesis--your paper is not acceptable unless it contains counterarguments. Otherwise, it's just useless propaganda.
But it is hard to make similar statements in favor of obscenity or pornography. Spoken obscenity--that is, "seven words you can't say on television"--is vulgar, but that's the way people talk. That's the way people have always talked in private, but there is no compelling social interest in having it as part of our public discourse [note: if I filled this message with expletives, I would be sternly reprimanded since it violates the "public respect" provision of the syllabus]. Thus, the FCC is within its regulatory jurisdiction to fine radio or television stations that air objectionable material. What social value does pornography possess? As far as I know, all it generates is moral depravity. I'm not sure that the government should concern itself with that (the domain of religion I'd say), but there is the danger of exposing children to it. Or if it's in a public place there's the issue of inadvertent exposure.
Now for the dissenting view. Previously I argued that such undemocratic and un-American documents as Mein Kampf and Communist Manifesto possess a sort of redeeming social value--albeit an inverted one. In the search for truth, censorship of minority views obscures rather than clarifies. "Truth" as a concept might best be represented as scientific in nature, and inherent in science is the doctrine of falsifiability. In other words, for a premise to be scientific one must be able to prove it wrong; being able to prove it "right" is insufficient. Ignoring the doctrine of falsifiability leads some scientists to disregard evidence that contradicts their theories while publishing only that which supports them--a cardinal sin in science. Similarly, in our great Democratic Experiment all the evidence is needed, even that which contradicts. Can the worthiness of liberal American values be taught only by allowing documents like the Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers, or "whitewashed" U.S. histories? Can the superior nature of "freedom" (as opposed to slavery) be demonstrated by book banning and censorship? It could be argued that censorship of minority opinions only makes them more attractive and powerful; freedom of speech and the press undercuts their subversive appeal. Justices Douglas and Black make a similar argument in their dissent in Roth v. United States:
"I can understand (and at times even sympathize) with programs of civic groups and church groups to protect and defend the existing moral standards of the community. I can understand the motives of the Anthony Comstocks who would impose Victorian standards on the community. When speech alone is involved, I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can become the sponsor of any of these movements. I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can throw its weight behind one school or another. Government should be concerned with antisocial conduct, not with utterances. Thus, if the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press is to mean anything in this field, it must allow protests even against the moral code that the standard of the day sets for the community. In other words, literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor."
Might it not be argued, then, that "morality" can only be achieved if "immorality" is freely available? Is this a sound equation--are obscenity, indecency, and pornography the moral equivalent of undemocratic and un-American political views? Why should one be available in our free society and not the other? In a sense, Douglas and Black are correct: the government has no vested interest in sponsoring (or censuring) mere speech; it is ACTION that is subject to governmental oversight. For example, the American Communist Party may have the freedom to peacefully assemble and indulge in whatever rhetoric they fancy, but if they should take up arms and attempt to overthrow the U.S. government by force (as per the Communist Manifesto, which calls for violent revolution), they could be charged with treason and sedition. Or if the American Nazi Party built death camps such as Auschwitz and Treblinka somewhere in Montana, began rounding up Jews (or any other non-Aryan), then shipping them there to be gassed, the government would have to step in to stop it. Free speech is one thing, criminal behavior another. What we call obscenity impacts the public forum--public places, public airwaves, literature, the Internet... and there is a vested interest in maintaining some degree of public decorum. As I said before, why can't we walk down the street naked? Why can't we perform sexual acts in public? Not because these things are necessarily "immoral" but because they offend public decency. What you do in the privacy of your own home is no one's business. According to Douglas and Black, "Government should be concerned with antisocial conduct, not with utterances." I tend to agree. But I would remind, even some utterances qualify as "antisocial conduct." Take conspiracy laws, for example. Suppose you devise a plan to rob a bank, then you invite a friend to assist in the holdup, then that friend invites another to drive the getaway car. Even though you've done nothing but talk, the crime of conspiracy has been committed. Now, if some link could be empirically proven between obscenity and criminality, that would bring a whole new dimension to the discussion. Although I personally think such a link exists, it is scientifically elusive.
[B]According to the Supreme Court, for material to be shorn of First Amendment protection (meaning it qualifies as "obscenity"), "three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value" [383 U.S. 413]. It does seem rather ludicrous that Supreme Court Justices of the United States should be required, as part of their judicial duties, to pore through endless reams of pornographic material to determine whether this piece or that has any "redeeming social value." Just what do we mean by "social value," anyway? Who is officially in charge of establishing "contemporary community standards"? And so on. I read enough of Fanny Hill to recognize that it is an early-modern sex novel, certainly qualifies as pornographic, and would most likely offend a majority of ordinary citizens. It reminds me a bit of Henry Miller, whose novels happen to be both pornographic and classic English literature. Although FH fails sections "a" and "b" of the three pronged test, section "c" is not so easily defined. Again I ask, just what is "redeeming social value"? There was a hit movie about ten years ago called Basic Instinct starring Michael Douglas and Sharon Stone. This film caused quite a stir when it came out because of its graphic sex scenes (in fact, it was originally rated X and had to be cut substantially to get an R rating). But Basic Instinct was a murder-suspense movie, not a cheap sex flick; the sexual content of the film was essential to the story line. Something of this nature, like FH, skirts the borderline of art and pornography. After all, Michelangelo’s "David" is a world renowned sculpture--a masterpiece by any definition. The fact that it is a nude male figure doesn't seem to offend anyone, save the most paranoid-puritanical among us. On the other hand, there is a vast quantity of material out there--graphic as well as literary--with no pretense of art at all; its sole purpose is sexual stimulation. The total absence of any traditional literary or artistic merit seems to be what the Supreme Court is trying to establish, and it's not too hard to see that FH does possess a modicum of literary merit (although it doesn't interest me). Those who are offended do not have to read the book.
One question I have to ask, however: what qualifies a Supreme Court Justice (or a preponderance of them) to determine the literary merits of this or that disputed book? This is the essence of Justice Douglas' concurring opinion: "We are judges, not literary experts or historians or philosophers. We are not competent to render an independent judgment as to the worth of this or any other book, except in our capacity as private citizens. I would pair my Brother CLARK on Fanny Hill with the Universalist minister I quote in the Appendix. If there is to be censorship, the wisdom of experts on such matters as literary merit and historical significance must be evaluated. On this record, the Court has no choice but to reverse the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, irrespective of whether we would include Fanny Hill in our own libraries" (ibid). This is like asking the Supreme Court to rank the top forty records of the Billboard charts--isn't that work best left to others? Expecting the Judicial Branch of the U.S. government to make judgments about artistic and literary works is a dubious science at best. And as the discussion question points out, how do you prove a negative? How do you demonstrate empirically that such and such has no redeeming value whatsoever? Actually, what you're asking the government to do is to define what acceptable public taste is. But acceptable to whom? The religious right? Muslim extremists? The moderate elements of the religious community or of the secular community? The (comparatively) small numbers of Americans who partake of the porn are no doubt offended by the judgmental rhetoric of the puritans. Douglas continues: "Every time an obscenity case is to be argued here, my office is flooded with letters and postal cards urging me [383 U.S. 413, 428] to protect the community or the Nation by striking down the publication. The messages are often identical even down to commas and semicolons. The inference is irresistible that they were all copied from a school or church blackboard. Dozens of postal cards often are mailed from the same precinct. The drives are incessant and the pressures are great. Happily we do not bow to them. I mention them only to emphasize the lack of popular understanding of our constitutional system" (ibid). It is not the government's job to rubberstamp the religious right's sectarian bias. There was a flap a few years ago over Kurt Vonnegut's novel Slaughterhouse Five (a work based on the author's army experiences in WWII) because it contained an expletive; the book was promptly banned from school libraries. Vonnegut stated that he included the expletive because that's the way soldiers talked. Personally, I believe that this sort of mindless censorship is far more threatening to our republic than any expletive.
[C]The term "community standards" is a hopelessly nebulous idea, bounded by political-religious-cultural bias on the one hand, and temporality on the other. The U.S. Supreme Court is, presumably, making decisions that will affect the entire nation; but is there any one definitive, predominant "community" in the United States? Actually, the USA is a vast conglomeration of independent and interlocking smaller communities. Politically, these can be seen as organized into 50 states; culturally they can be organized any number of ways. So the question is, which community are we talking about? The Republican community is no doubt offended by many things the Democratic community accepts (such as gay rights, abortion, etc.); the religious community is offended by the "immorality" of the non-religious community; the environmentalist community is offended by the attitudes and actions of the business community; and so on. For every concern, there's a counter-concern; for every agenda, there's a counter-agenda. That's what I mean by "political-religious-cultural bias." Temporality refers to the changing times and the mores that apply to those times. Community standards of today are not at all like they were even 50 years ago. The 1950s were the years my parents were young. It was the era of Eisenhower, McCarthyism, conservatism, when everyone was expected to conform--the era of Ward and June Cleaver. Before that was the Victorian era, leading up to World War I. The Puritanical standards of those days (you know, when women were forced to wear those ankle-length dresses) would have found standards of the '50s objectionable. But before the Victorian era was another, much more libertarian era--that of the 18th century. In many ways, 18th century America (the time of the American Revolution) was remarkably liberal, even compared to today: religion was declining, social controls were loosening, sexual license was not at all unheard of [note: sexual scandals surrounded virtually all the Founding Fathers, including Jefferson, Hamilton, Burr, Franklin, even the Godlike Washington]. The puritanical impulse in America did not reassert itself until the 19th century, a fact the Supreme Court grapples with in Memoirs:
"...there is an absence of any federal cases or laws relative to obscenity in the period immediately after the adoption of the First Amendment. Congress passed no legislation relating to obscenity until the middle of the nineteenth century. Neither reason nor history warrants exclusion of any particular class of expression from the protection of the First Amendment on nothing more than a judgment that it is utterly without merit. We faced the difficult questions the First Amendment poses with regard to libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, [383 U.S. 413, 431] 376 U.S. 254, 269 , where we recognized that 'libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.' We ought not to permit fictionalized assertions of constitutional history to obscure those questions here. Were the Court to undertake that inquiry, it would be unable, in my opinion, to escape the conclusion that no interest of society with regard to suppression of 'obscene' literature could override the First Amendment to justify censorship."
The "fictionalized assertions of constitutional history" refers to the sort of revisionist rhetoric fashionable in Evangelical circles these days: the idea that colonial and revolutionary period America was a "golden age" of morality and vivid Christianity, that the Founding Fathers were like crusading saints seeking to establish, in America, a kingdom of God on earth, that the Constitution is based directly on "Bible principles," and so on. That's a lot of nonsense, of course. As I explained above, the 18th century was the era of Enlightenment, and it was aggressively secular. Some of the Founding Fathers were religious, others weren't. Many of them were Deists, which was damned in those days as heresy--something akin to atheism. At any rate, the U.S. government is supposed to be neutral on these matters. When one comprehends the "liberal" ideology that accompanied the revolutionary period (which, in fact, made the Revolution possible. Otherwise, the American colonies, like Canada, would have become independent at a much later date), an era very similar to the 1960s, it's not hard to see why the crusade against "obscenity" and "indecency" is somewhat at odds with the Bill of Rights. Expecting the government, in this case the Supreme Court, to define what is acceptable in terms of speech or literature, in every particular, is to reverse the proper role that the government should play--that is, the government should serve the interests of the people, not the other way around. We should not expect the Supreme Court to define public morality; rather, the Court should ascertain what the prevailing standard of morality is (and in the U.S. it is fairly well established), and uphold that standard in the least intrusive manner possible. After reading some of these cases, I believe that the Court has performed admirably and within its limits. The tricky thing about freedom is this: it has to encompass one and all. If you have freedom of worship, then you MUST, by definition, include the freedom not to worship. It must be non-compulsory. If you have freedom of speech, then even objectionable speech must be protected. If you have freedom of assembly, then even despicable groups like the KKK must be allowed to (peacefully) assemble. Of course, no right is absolute, not even in the USA. Every right and every liberty has to be qualified in some way.
The main problem I see with Justice Clark's dissent in the Memoirs case is the lack of any hard, empirical evidence proving that pornography "can lead to criminal behavior." There is some "expert" testimony to that effect, but that testimony seems to be little more than opinion. Similarly, Clark, when considering the literary and artistic merits of Fanny Hill, rejects "expert" testimony that contradicts his opinion of the book. If law at this highest level is supposed to be based upon facts and evidence, rather than a host of contrasting value judgments, then Justice Clark's dissent is sorely lacking. First let's consider the book's literary merits (or lack thereof). One of several experts testified, "'I think it is a work of art . . . it asks for and receives a literary response . . . presented in an orderly and organized fashion, with a fictional central character, and with a literary style . . . . I think the central character is . . . what I call an intellectual . . . someone who is extremely curious about life and who seeks . . . to record with accuracy the details of the external world, physical sensations, psychological responses . . . an empiricist . . . . I find that this tells me things . . . about the 18th century that I might not otherwise know.'" [383 U.S. 413]. To which Clark responds:
"If a book of art is one that asks for and receives a literary response, Memoirs is no work of art. The sole response evoked by the book is sensual. Nor does the orderly presentation of Memoirs make a difference; it presents nothing but lascivious scenes organized solely to arouse prurient interest and produce sustained erotic tension. Certainly the book's baroque style cannot vitiate the determination of obscenity. From a legal standpoint, we must remember that obscenity is no less obscene though it be expressed in 'elaborate language.' Indeed, the more meticulous its presentation, the more it appeals to the prurient interest. To say that Fanny is an 'intellectual' is an insult to those who travel under that tag. She was nothing but a harlot - a sensualist - exploiting her sexual attractions which she sold for fun, for money, for lodging and keep, for an inheritance, and finally for a husband. If she was curious about life, her curiosity extended only to the pursuit of sexual delight wherever she found it. The book describes nothing in the 'external world' except bawdy houses and debaucheries. As an empiricist, Fanny confines her observations and 'experiments' to sex, with primary attention to depraved, lewd, and deviant practices."
One man's art is another man's waste of time, isn't it so? Although the State could have put on expert witnesses of its own, declaring that FH had no literary value whatsoever, it did not. But the defense's experts all testified as to the book's merits. These experts were, I imagine, literary critics, college English professors, and the like. One says the book "asks for and receives a literary response," to which Clark replies, "The sole response evoked by the book is sensual." When the expert cites a literary style, Clark responds, "Certainly the book's baroque style cannot vitiate the determination of obscenity... Indeed, the more meticulous its presentation, the more it appeals to the prurient interest." Upon what does Justice Clark base that assertion? The more skillfully the thing is written, the greater its appeal to the base and degenerate? Yes, a certain amount of competence is required in any writing--even pornographic--but might not this book's "redeeming social value" be found in its use of language? Suppose for the sake of argument that Shakespeare had written and produced a pornographic play just to make a few pounds on the side. Suppose he adorned the various sex scenes with his usual, brilliant Elizabethan language? Even though we wouldn't be studying it in high school (because of its X rating), would it not be considered a work of art nonetheless? I believe that it would. Justice Clark would probably find it offensive either way. What about his statement that calling Fanny Hill an "intellectual" insults others who bear that label? Who's to say that she's not an intellectual? Just because she's a prostitute does not impugn her intelligence level. The implication is that immorality is a function of lower intelligence. I beg to differ. I doubt intelligence has anything to do with one's sense of morals--in other words, intellectuals can be just as moral or immoral as anyone else. Clearly, Clark is offended by FH and no amount of testimony is going to convince him otherwise. His opinion is full of logical contradictions; he is trying to rationalize a visceral response: instead of just saying "This offends me," he offers up a list of disingenuous reasons. Now for the idea that pornography leads to criminality:
"...there are medical experts who believe that such stimulation frequently manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other antisocial conduct. For example, Dr. George W. Henry of Cornell University has expressed the opinion that obscenity, with its exaggerated and morbid emphasis on sex, particularly abnormal and perverted practices, and its unrealistic presentation of sexual behavior and attitudes, may induce antisocial conduct by the average person. A number of sociologists think that this material may have adverse effects upon individual mental health, with potentially disruptive consequences for the community. In addition, there is persuasive evidence from criminologists and police officials. Inspector Herbert Case of the Detroit Police Department contends that sex murder cases are invariably tied to some form of obscene literature. And the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, has repeatedly emphasized that pornography is associated with an overwhelmingly large number of sex crimes."
I hate to sound as though I'm defending pornography. The few times I've been exposed to it only made me feel sick. So I agree that porn is virtually worthless. Nevertheless, I see little evidence of sound reasoning in Justice Clark's arguments. Even my undergraduate criminology classes here at CNU drive the point relentlessly home: correlation does not equal causality. There may indeed be a correlation between pornography and sex crimes (or other criminal acts). For example, serial killer Ted Bundy blamed many of his vicious homicides on exposure to pornography. Question is, had there been no pornography, would he have still been a serial killer? Probably. Dr. George W. Henry of Cornell University expresses the opinion that obscenity MAY induce antisocial conduct...sociologists think that this material MAY have adverse effects...But on the other hand, it may not. No causality can be demonstrated. Inspector Herbert Case and J. Edgar Hoover both associate obscene literature with sex crimes; there is correlation but no causality. Even Clark admits it, writing, "...the correlation between possession of obscenity and deviant behavior has not been conclusively established..." [383 U.S. 413, 453]. It hasn't been conclusively established because it can't be. But why would there be a correlation at all? Most likely because persons who are predisposed to commit sex crimes are also predisposed to indulge in obscene literature. Let me use the example of recent sex scandals in the Catholic Church. Many Catholic priests are now being exposed as pedophiles. Many are blaming this scourge on celibacy. Is there some aspect of the priesthood, then, (such as celibacy) that turns ordinary men into pedophiles? I doubt it. I think the most likely explanation is this: the priesthood is an occupation that is quite attractive to sexually dysfunctional individuals--including pedophiles. Men who know that they will never marry or have a normal sex life may be going into the priesthood as way of avoiding their pathology. That's another example of correlation, but no causality.
[D]The Supreme Court's Ruling in New York v. Ferber (1982) reflects the belief that there is a fundamental difference between adults and children (defined, for our purposes, as anyone underage), one which must be respected by law. To put it in legal terms, the government has a "compelling" interest in protecting children--an interest that does not necessarily extend to adults. Research, experience, and plain common sense demonstrate that abused and exploited children frequently become maladjusted, sociopathic adults--sometimes capable of horrendous crimes. For example, studies show that children who endure parental violence (and I don't mean simple corporal punishment; I mean real violence) are at high risk of becoming child-abusers themselves. Similarly, young boys who witness their fathers abusing their mothers often become spouse abusers as well. Somehow, such emotional damage perverts the normal growth process. Psychological evaluations of violent sociopaths, such as serial killers, reveal high instances of childhood trauma. By protecting children, the state is, in fact, protecting itself. What is the harmful effect of child pornography, then? According to the Court:
"The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled. Indeed, there is no serious contention that the legislature was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pursuing only those who produce the photographs and movies. While the production of pornographic materials is a low-profile, clandestine industry, the need to market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of distribution. The most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product."
This argument, apparently, is meant to counter the assertion (which must have been made; otherwise the Court would not address it) that the distribution of child porn is not intrinsically harmful to children. In other words, what harm to children comes from those distributing, selling, and buying this sort of material? The harm is indirect: by creating or sustaining a demand, suppliers are sure to appear. It's like the drug market. If there was little or no demand for illegal drugs in the United States (or elsewhere), there would not be drug cartels in places like Columbia or Mexico. Without the lure of quick, easy profit (and for drugs the profits are enormous), there would be no drug dealer or supplier. Those individuals would be making a living some other way. But in the porn industry, it is the suppliers who exploit the children. By feeding the demand, distributors and their customers sustain the suppliers, and by extension the sexual abuse of children. That's why the government is just as likely to come down on a simple user as it would a distributor or supplier; they're all part of the same malignancy. In the Memoirs and Miller cases, however, the focus is on the obscene material itself (rather than the unhealthy effects on the participants). We can overlook the fact that the character of Fanny Hill was a mere fifteen years old; by the standards of that day, fifteen was not "underage" as such. The average lifespan was only about 40 years. Those who reached their 50s or 60s were uncommon specimens of health. So girls were often expected to marry right after puberty. Nevertheless, in Memoirs and Miller the Court does not address the effects of pornography on the participants--neither producer nor customer. It simply focuses on the fact that such materials are "offensive." Being offensive to community standards, obscenity does not enjoy First Amendment protection and can be regulated by statute. Strictly speaking (in those two cases), the Court is not making a moralistic judgment on the likely effects of pornography on the human soul. On that matter, they appear to be silent. Rather, they are explaining why such material is not constitutionally protected. But the argument in Ferber is otherwise, alluded to by the fact that child pornography need not be "obscene" to be illegal. Even "suggestive" material (not strictly obscene) may fall under that prohibition, and there is only one reason: it is harmful to children. That's not to say that adults remain unharmed by it. But adults have a different status under the law. Adults are supposedly capable of making mature and informed decisions, and whether they choose wisely or not is not a "compelling" governmental interest. Many are the harmful (although legal) vices available to adults, but not to children.
[E]First, my position on abortion: I'll never have one; what others choose to do doesn't concern me. That rather poor attempt at humor (in an uncommonly humorless debate) does point out the irony inherent in the spectacle of MEN deciding whether it is lawful for women to abort their pregnancies (were there any female Justices on the Roe v. Wade Court?). Since abortion laws directly affect only the distaff side of the population, prudence would seem to dictate that justice be rendered by women. Just as no white person in America can truly understand the racial discrimination endured by blacks, no man is capable of comprehending the travails of pregnant women. Having said that, however, I find it remarkable that the Court upheld a woman's right to abortion. There is no clear historical consensus: Some pre-Christian cultures condemned the practice, others casually embraced it. As I mentioned in a previous message, infanticide was practiced in some cultures--and here there is no question that such an act is homicide. But the State justified it on grounds of preserving only the fittest and healthiest individuals; only they were deemed fit to live. Common law centered on the "quickening" period, defining it as the moment an unborn child became an entity apart from its mother. But there is also a religious tradition that regards the beginning of "life" as post-natal:
"It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes 'viable,' that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks" [410 U.S. 113].
I think, however, the term "life" is entirely too amorphous to be of use in this debate. Many things that we routinely exterminate as a matter of public health have "life" (flies, mosquitoes, etc.). Even "human life" is a bit vague. The controversy, in my estimation, centers upon the question: at what point does "personhood" apply? When is an individual a complete and independent human being, with citizenship, legal rights, and so on? Philosophical, moral, and theological arguments aside, what we are discussing is law. What legal precepts apply to unborn individuals? Obviously, once a person is born--once the umbilical is cut and the infant draws its first breath--it is legally "complete and independent." An infant one minute old is a U.S. citizen (if born in the United States), has constitutional rights, can get a social security number, and may even be subject to local, state, and federal taxes! According to U.S. law, children are not "sub-persons," but have full personhood from the moment of birth. But one minute prior to birth--or one hour, one day, one week, one month--the situation is not so clear. The problem comes (along with all the strife) when one attaches full "personhood" to the unborn, which is apparently the position of the anti-abortion crowd. Even if this appeals to one's personal philosophy or theology, it is a veritable can of worms when applied to the law. For example, suppose we attach full personhood in the legal sense to each individual from the moment of conception: that fertilized egg (zygote) is, by definition, a person, a U.S. citizen with legal rights and obligations. Further suppose the zygote divides, forming monozygotic twins. During pregnancy the twins struggle within the womb, such that one is born alive, the other stillborn. Do we then charge the surviving twin with manslaughter, or even murder, for the fratricide it committed? Or perhaps the mother should be charged. For legal purposes, when shall personhood be conferred? The religious position has been debated for centuries:
"The Aristotelian theory of 'mediate animation,' that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this 'ensoulment' theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from the moment of conception. The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a 'process' over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the 'morning-after' pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs" [ibid].
In short, pure science does not lend itself very well to philosophical, moral, and theological controversies (nor to legal debates, it seems to me). For practical purposes, as well as simplicity's sake, the moment of live birth should be the dividing line recognized by law. That's not to say the law cannot address a multitude of issues concerning the disposition of the unborn--i.e. it would be legally irresponsible to assert that an unborn child scant moments (or days) from birth is entitled to NO protection whatsoever. Clearly, such unborns are viable--another line of demarcation. But full personhood cannot be conferred until the moment of birth.
ReferencesFeinberg, Joel. "Hard Cases for the Harm Principle." Rpt. in Morality and the Law, Eds. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1988.
Hart, H.L.A. "The Legal Enforcement of Morality." Rpt. in Morality and the Law, Eds.
Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1988.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
Randall, Willard Stern. Thomas Jefferson: A Life. New York: Holt, 1993.
